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ABSTRACT
We study the stock exchange rivalry between the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and the
Consolidated Stock Exchange (Consolidated) from 1885 to 1926 using a new database of bid-ask
spreads and stock data collected from The  New  York Times and other primary sources. The
magnitude of this important, but largely forgotten rivalry was substantial. From 1885 to 1895, the
ratio of Consolidated to NYSE volume averaged 40 percent and reached as high as 60 percent. The
market share of the Consolidated averaged 23 percent for approximately 40 years. The Consolidated
focused on the relatively liquid securities on the NYSE as measured by bid-ask spreads and trading
volume. Our results suggest that NYSE bid-ask spreads fell by more than 10 percent when the
Consolidated began to trade NYSE stocks while bid-ask spreads for our quasicontrol group of stocks
trading on the Boston Stock Exchange remain unchanged. The effect persisted over the entire history
of the stock market rivalry until a series of scandals and investigations of the Consolidated by state
regulators led to the demise of the exchange in the 1920s. The analysis suggests three conclusions:
(1) the NYSE has faced significant long-run competition (2) the NYSE may be susceptible to a
similar level of competition in the future and (3) that the Consolidated may have improved the
efficiency of stock prices by contributing to the price discovery process.
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  For a significant part of its 213-year history, the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) has 
reigned as the leading stock exchange both within the United States and across the world. 
Recently, ongoing changes in technology and the globalization of stock trading have given rise to 
a number of competitors that threaten the NYSE’s position as the preeminent stock exchange. 
Technological change has played an important role in fostering the development of alternative 
trading systems (Macey and O’Hara, 1999). The globalization of trading may have large and 
significant effects on financial markets (Ramos, 2003). Indeed, in the July 21, 2005, S-4 filing 
related to its proposed merger with Archipelago, a rival exchange, the NYSE identifies the 
growth of global capital markets and the emergence of electronic communications networks as a 
significant threat to its dominant market share (p. 141). 
 The  recently  completed merger between the two exchanges raises many questions about 
the effects of head-to-head stock market competition with the NYSE. Unfortunately, prior 
empirical evidence offers little insight into this important public policy question. Research 
focusing on past (e.g., Branch and Freed (1977), Hamilton (1976, 1979, 1987), Tinic (1972)) and 
more recent episodes (e.g., Battalio (1997), Battalio, Greene and Jennings (1997)) of direct 
trading competition with the NYSE has studied relatively minor magnitudes of off-exchange 
trading by regional exchanges and/or the third market. Much of this minimal competition was 
often related to regulatory mandates by the Securities and Exchange Commission. (See Jarrell 
(1984) and Arnold, Hersch, Mulherin and Netter (1999).) 
  The lack of evidence on established NYSE competitors raises an even more fundamental 
question: Is the NYSE susceptible to significant competition? Previous work by Stigler (1961, 
1964) suggests that the NYSE has natural monopoly characteristics and Chowdry and Nanda 
(1991) model the “winner takes most” feature of securities market trading concentration. The 
empirical evidence of Demsetz (1968) and Doede (1967) finds that the NYSE has economies of 
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securities markets in the 1990s. Moreover, recent work by Barclay, Hendershott and McCormick 
(2003) reports that although electronic communication networks (ECNs) have made significant 
inroads against NASDAQ, the ECNs have made a much smaller dent in the trading of NYSE 
listings. 
  In this paper, we provide new evidence on both the viability and the nature of direct 
trading competition with the NYSE. We study the Consolidated Stock Exchange, a rival stock 
exchange that competed directly with the “Big Board” from 1885 to 1926. For almost 42 years, 
the Consolidated was an important competitor and garnered an average annual market share 
reaching as high as 60 percent of NYSE trading volume. This sustained incidence of competition 
with the NYSE came at a time of significant technological change in securities trading and 
thereby has direct relevance to the current competitive forces confronting the NYSE today. 
Although the Consolidated has been noted in historical research by Nelson (1907), Garvy 
(1944), and Sobel (1972) and in more recent analysis of the property rights to price quotations by 
Mulherin, Netter and Overdahl (1991), there is little or no systematic analysis of this exchange’s 
impact on the NYSE. Indeed, in an otherwise insightful and comprehensive analysis, Doede 
(1967) discounts the importance of the rival exchange due to the absence of reported data on 
Consolidated trading volume (p. 27). We fill the historical and empirical void of this important 
episode of stock exchange competition with newly collected data from The New York Times and 
other sources. 
  Our analysis focuses on the effects of competition on the bid-ask spreads for NYSE 
stocks. We employ a series of complementary tests to identify the effects of stock market 
competition. We first study the impact of competition on bid-ask spreads when the Consolidated 
began to trade NYSE stocks in 1885. Then we analyze the effects of competition on bid-ask 
spreads for approximately 40 years of the stock exchange rivalry. Our results suggest that NYSE 
bid-ask spreads fell by more than 10 percent when the Consolidated began to trade NYSE stocks 
  2while bid-ask spreads for our quasi-control group of stocks trading on the Boston Stock Exchange 
remain unchanged. The effect persisted across the 42-year rivalry between the two exchanges 
until a series of scandals and investigations by the New York State Attorney General’s Office in 
the 1920s led to the demise of the Consolidated. The findings are robust to a wide variety of 
changes in the empirical model and estimation technique. In addition, the empirical analysis 
suggests that the Consolidated may have improved the efficiency of stock prices by contributing 
to the price discovery process. Overall, our results suggest that the NYSE has faced significant 
long-run competition and may be susceptible to a similar level of competition in the future.   
  The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 1 describes the trading 
environment on the NYSE in the years prior to the onset of competition by the Consolidated in 
1885. Section 2 reports data on the magnitude and nature of the stock market competition 
provided by the rival exchange over the period 1885 to 1926. Section 3 analyzes the short and 
long-run effects of competition on NYSE bid-ask quotes and tests whether the Consolidated 
contributed to the price discovery process. Section 4 summarizes the results and concludes the 
paper with a discussion of the implications of our findings for future studies of stock market 
competition. 
 
1. The Trading Environment at the Onset of Competition  
  The Consolidated Stock Exchange was formed in early 1885 by the merger of the New 
York Mining Stock and Petroleum Exchange, the New York Petroleum Exchange and Stock 
Board and the Miscellaneous Securities Board. These exchanges initially specialized in mining 
and petroleum securities that were not traded on the NYSE. Soon after the merger, however, the 
Consolidated began trading railroad stocks and other securities listed on the NYSE. The New 
York Times reported that the Consolidated decided to trade NYSE listed securities in news articles 
dated January 21, 1885 and February 14, 1885. The newspapers began reporting Consolidated 
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articles).
1  
The onset of competition from the Consolidated occurred during a period of rapid growth 
in the depth and the breadth of trading on the NYSE. As reported in Table 1, in the ten years prior 
to the formation of the Consolidated, trading volume steadily rose and was, on average, twice as 
high in the 1880-1884 period compared to the 1875-1879 period. The number of trading days 
exceeded more than 300 each year because the NYSE opened for an abbreviated session of 
business on Saturday until after World War II.  
As reported in Table 2, the growth in volume was accompanied by an increase in listings 
on the NYSE, as proxied by the number of NYSE-listed firms reported daily in The New York 
Times. Historical records from the NYSE confirm that listings doubled on the exchange between 
1875 and 1884. (See, e.g., the 1940 New York Stock Exchange Yearbook, p.49.) In addition, the 
median bid-ask spread increased across all NYSE stocks as the number of securities reported in 
The New York Times rose over time. However, the median spread for firms with reported trading 
volume remained at 0.25 for most of the period. Railroads or Western Union were the most active 
security for the sampled day in a given year. These securities always traded at the minimum tick 
of one-eighth. 
  Studies by Garvy (1944), Michie (1986), and Mulherin, Netter and Overdahl (1991) link 
the growth in the depth and breadth of NYSE trading activity to various technological 
innovations. The transatlantic cable was completed in 1866 and the stock ticker was invented in 
1867. Telephones soon followed in 1878. Garbade and Silber (1978) report that financial markets 
readily adopted these new technologies. Accompanying organizational innovations such as the 
movement from call to continuous markets enhanced the available market for NYSE listings as 
well as the capacity for the exchange to trade. 
                                                 
1 For background on the formation of the Consolidated Stock Exchange, see Nelson (1907), Garvy (1944), 
Sobel (1972), and Mulherin, Netter and Overdahl (1991). 
 
  4  The innovations that enhanced the potential of the NYSE also increased the probability of 
competition from existing and rival exchanges (e.g., Garvy (1944), Michie (1986), and Mulherin, 
Netter and Overdahl (1991)). The Consolidated’s more than 2,000 members conducted trading on 
a floor in a building a few blocks from Wall Street at the corner of Broad and Beaver Streets. 
Because the NYSE, the New York Mining Stock and Petroleum Exchange and other predecessors 
had gentlemen’s agreements not to engage in direct trading competition, the Consolidated at its 
inception possessed stock tickers linked to the NYSE and thereby had ready access to the 
information required to engage in the trading of NYSE listings.  
The Consolidated attracted trading in NYSE listings by charging lower commissions, 
offering odd lot trading, and allowing a longer settlement period. The rival exchange even 
functioned as the primary New York market when it opened one-half hour before the NYSE for a 
period beginning in July 1912.  Commission rates on the Consolidated averaged 1/16
th of the par 
value of a stock or half the brokerage commission charged by the NYSE. However, the NYSE 
had several loopholes that allowed members to bypass its high brokerage fees. Members that 
bought and sold stock between each other were charged rates as low as 1/32
nd of par value and 
deals between brokers on the floor of the exchange could go as low as 1/50 percent of a stock’s 
par value. The discount on commissions was extended to all partners of an NYSE firm even if 
they did not own a seat on the exchange. The discount policy led to the creation of ever larger 
stockbroking firms (Michie, 1986). The Consolidated also dealt in odd lots, executing trades of 
only 10 shares as opposed to the NYSE that required an order size of at least 100 shares.
2 In 
addition, the Consolidated had a two-week settlement period as opposed to the daily settlement 
period for the NYSE. The payment system used by the Big Board often exacerbated financial 
crises as bankers and brokers had little time to take countermeasures to avoid a crisis. Following a 
                                                 
2 Ott (2004) shows that odd lot trading accounted for as much as 40 percent of the business of NYSE 
members by 1921. She also provides historical evidence that NYSE member firms often sold odd lots to 
retail customers at stale prices and that such trading was a highly profitable business for NYSE members.  
  5significant decline in stock prices, brokers might not be able to raise significant capital to repay 
their margin loans to banks. 
The New York Stock Exchange immediately responded to the Consolidated’s decision to 
trade Big Board stocks. The NYSE implemented a series of measures in 1885 and 1886 to limit 
the Consolidated’s ability to gain market share. The NYSE passed a resolution mandating that 
400 of its members drop their affiliation with the Consolidated (Mulherin, Netter, and Overdahl, 
1991). In 1888, the New York Stock Exchange even suspended one of its members for 
conducting business with the rival exchange, although this measure did not eliminate trading 
between the two rivals as some brokers continued to conduct business and arbitrage price 
differences on the two exchanges. The New York Times often printed articles that discussed 
various aspects of competition between the two exchanges. In a February 27, 1891 article “A 
Wall Street Quarantine,” the newspaper reported that the NYSE passed a resolution to limit 
competition from the Consolidated. 
 
“After a lull, the old battle between the Stock Exchange and its youthful neighbor on the other 
side of New Street has broken out again... At the meeting of its Governors Tuesday a resolution 
was passed which was not made public until yesterday. It is a stringent order, and it reads in this 
way: Resolved, That all communications between this Exchange and the Consolidated Stock and 
Petroleum Exchange, or any part of the building thereof, by means of messengers or clerks, or in 
any other manner, directly or indirectly, is detrimental to the interests and welfare of this Exchange, 
and is hereby prohibited.” 
 
The NYSE also established an unlisted department that traded only “speculative” stocks listed on 
the Consolidated. Although this measure primarily covered mining and other less important 
securities, it signaled the NYSE’s intention to limit competition from the rival exchange.  
The Big Board also challenged the Consolidated’s use of its ticker. The rival exchange 
purchased ticker service from the Commercial Telegram Company, one of two firms --the second 
firm was the Gold and Stock Telegraph Company-- the NYSE contracted to collect and 
disseminate stock quotes. This set off a 15-year court war between the two exchanges. The NYSE 
maintained that it owned the property rights to the price quotes, while the Consolidated believed 
  6that price quotes were public property. Although the courts ruled in 1887 that stock quotes were 
private property, they also ruled that the NYSE did not own the price quotes as long as they hired 
firms to collect and disseminate the quotes. Since the Commercial Telegram Company did not 
answer the NYSE’s complaint, the courts also granted the firm an injunction that prevented the 
NYSE from removing the ticker from the floor of the Consolidated. Court rulings prompted the 
NYSE to change its operating procedures and to alter the nature of its long-term contracts with 
firms that provided ticker service. In 1892, the NYSE began to collect stock quotes and transmit 
stock quotes to the Gold and Stock Telegraph Company. The telegraph firm then supplied price 
quotes to NYSE customers. The NYSE also removed tickers from members that gave 
nonmembers access to the price quotes. The courts established that the NYSE owned the price 
quotes in 1899 when they ruled that the Big Board could remove its ticker from the office of a 
Consolidated broker (Mulherin, Netter, and Overdahl, 1991).
3 Although the courts ruled that the 
NYSE could remove tickers from the offices of Consolidated brokers or other individuals they 
chose not to do business with, the rival exchange continued to have access to the NYSE ticker 
through the court injunction granted in 1887. 
 
2. The Magnitude and Nature of the Stock Market Rivalry  
  The rivalry between the Consolidated and the NYSE lasted from 1885 to 1926. Table 3 
provides estimates of the magnitude of the 42-year rivalry between the NYSE and the 
Consolidated Stock Exchange from 1885-1926. We report the annual volume of common stock 
on the NYSE, the annual volume of NYSE-listed stocks on the Consolidated, and the ratio of 
Consolidated volume to NYSE volume. (See the Data Appendix for data sources.) The data show 
that the Consolidated quickly gained a significant share of the trading volume of NYSE-listed 
securities. In the first ten years of its existence, the ratio of Consolidated to NYSE volume 
                                                 
3 The Appendix of News articles provides a sketch of the ongoing competition. Nelson (1907), Garvy 
(1944) and Sobel (1972) provide historical treatments of the rivalry. Mulherin, Netter and Overdahl (1991) 
emphasize the legal disputes over property rights to NYSE price quotations. 
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4 
Over the course of the stock exchange rivalry, the Consolidated averaged 23.48 percent of NYSE 
volume. As late as 1921, the ratio of Consolidated to NYSE volume was 25.87 percent.  
The rivalry ended in February 1926 with the demise of the Consolidated. Garvy (1944) 
and Sobel (1972) point to accusations of fraud and the prosecution of the Consolidated by the 
Attorney General of the State of New York under the auspices of the Martin Act of 1921.
5 
William Silkworth, President of the Consolidated Stock Exchange in the early 1920s, allegedly 
misused a rescue fund in early 1922 for his own personal gain after asking member firms of the 
exchange to contribute to the fund.  A few months later, one of the Consolidated’s leading and 
most respected brokerage houses, Edward M. Fuller & Company declared bankruptcy. Silkworth 
was accused of embezzling funds from the brokerage house even though he denied any wrong-
doing. Although Silkworth was subsequently exonerated of the charges, a Fuller executive 
pleaded guilty to fraud. The Consolidated continued to trade securities after the scandals and even 
introduced reforms to eliminate corruption on the exchange.
6 However, the historical evidence 
suggests that the reputation of the exchange had been irreparably damaged. News reports at the 
time (see the Appendix of News Articles) indicate that attempts to revive the rival exchange 
ended with the revelation that the Consolidated did not possess the right to the tickers 
                                                 
4 The data collected from The New York Times contain total volume for listed and unlisted securities but the 
NYSE only reports data for listed securities. As a result, our total volume data for the NYSE undercounts 
total volume for the period between 1888 and 1910 for the NYSE, when the NYSE closed its unlisted 
securities department. The total volume of unlisted securities is relatively small with the exception of 
American Sugar, which was a component of the Dow Industrial Average. We have NYSE volume data for 
American Sugar for the last day of the month from April 1894 until 1926.  These data suggest that Table 3 
may overstate the Consolidated’s total volume relative to the NYSE by three percent to eight percent from 
1893 to 1902 when American Sugar was among the most actively traded securities on both exchanges. This 
discrepancy does not affect our formal analyses which are conducted on individual securities where we 
have the actual data from both exchanges. 
5 The Martin Act has recently been used by Eliot Spitzer to indict Wall Street brokers and executives in the 
recent wave of corporate scandals. 
6 Ott (2004) shows that politics played an important role in the collapse of the Consolidated. She argues 
that the NYSE engaged in a public relations campaign from 1913 until 1929 and captured the New York 
State Attorney General’s Office which investigated the Consolidated for stock fraud and wash sales. Ott 
concludes that a public relations campaign by the NYSE was quite successful and that the Big Board 
managed to avoid significant federal and state regulation until the New Deal. 
  8transmitting NYSE price quotes in early 1927. Doede (1967) also notes that the emergence of the 
New York Curb Exchange in the early twentieth century (later the American Stock Exchange), 
which adopted a more amicable and non-competitive relation with the NYSE, also led to a 
weakening of the Consolidated’s position after 1909. 
Table 4 presents some information on the nature of the 42-year stock market rivalry 
between the NYSE and the Consolidated. We collected trading data from a single day for each 
year between 1885 and 1926. Table 4 reports data on the number of NYSE firms listed, the 
number of NYSE firms with positive trading volume, and the number of NYSE-listed firms with 
trading volume on the Consolidated. (See the Data Appendix for specific dates and sources.) As 
reported in Table 4, the Consolidated tended to trade only a subset of NYSE listings on a given 
day. From 1885 to 1926, the Consolidated traded a median of 18 percent of NYSE listings. The 
median fraction of NYSE listings with volume that also traded on the Consolidated was 33 
percent. 
Table 5 provides evidence that the Consolidated tended to trade the relatively liquid 
NYSE listings. For a single day in each year between 1885 and 1926, the table reports the median 
bid-ask spread on the NYSE. While the median absolute (relative) bid-ask spread for all NYSE 
stocks with quotes averages $1.00 (2.08 percent) over the entire time period, the median absolute 
(relative) spread of the NYSE listings that also traded on the Consolidated averages $0.25 (0.53 
percent). This is also lower than the average absolute (relative) spread of $0.75 (1.60 percent) for 
stocks with volume on the NYSE but not on the Consolidated. The tendency for a rival exchange 
to trade relatively more liquid NYSE listings resembles the results found from studies of modern-
day markets (e.g., Easley, Kiefer and O’Hara (1996), Battalio (1997)). 
Table 6 provides additional evidence that the Consolidated tended to trade relatively 
liquid NYSE listings. For a single day in each of the sample years, the table reports the most 
heavily traded security on both the NYSE and the Consolidated. For 21 of the 42 years (50 
percent of the time), the most heavily traded security on the NYSE was also the most heavily 
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the NYSE not in the top five in trading on the Consolidated. The most heavily traded security on 
both exchanges tended to trade at the minimum bid-ask spread of one-eighth, providing further 
evidence that the Consolidated emphasized relatively liquid NYSE listings. 
The fact that the Consolidated, like many current-day NYSE competitors, tended to trade 
relatively more liquid securities poses some complications in identifying the effect of competition 
on the NYSE. As noted in the initial research on bid-ask spreads by Demsetz (1968, p. 45), 
measures of competition are likely to be associated with the rate of transactions across securities. 
Similarly, Tinic (1972, p. 88) notes that any measure of inter-exchange competition might also 
proxy for long-run trading activity. Such concerns were certainly present in the early analysis of 
NYSE bid-ask spreads and exchange competition that tended to be cross-sectional studies over a 
short time interval. 
To estimate the effect of stock market competition initiated by the Consolidated, we 
perform a series of complementary tests. We begin with a natural experiment in which we study 
the effect of the onset of competition on NYSE bid-ask spreads. This experiment implicitly treats 
the onset of the Consolidated as an exogenous event. Boehmer and Boehmer (2003) have a 
similar research design in their recent study of the NYSE entry into the market of Exchange 
Traded Funds (ETFs). We then perform a panel study of the effect of the Consolidated on NYSE 
bid-ask spreads over the entire 42-year rivalry of the two exchanges. Such analysis resembles 
Wahal’s (1997) recent work on the effects of dealer competition on NASDAQ and avoids the 
critique of the early studies of the NYSE that focused on short periods of time. 
 
3. Empirical Evidence  
A. The Onset of Stock Market Competition 
  Our empirical analysis of stock market competition begins with the Consolidated’s 
decision to trade NYSE stocks. This event provides a natural experiment to study the behavior of 
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NYSE. To investigate this question, we estimate a series of regressions using NYSE bid ask-
spreads as the dependent variable for a one-year period before and after the initiation of trading in 
NYSE listings by the Consolidated in February 1885. The regression analysis controls for firm-
specific factors such as trading volume, price level, and return volatility that prior studies have 
found to affect bid-ask spreads (Demsetz 1968, Tinic 1972, Branch and Freed, 1977). The basic 
model can be written as: 
  
SPREADit= α0 + β1VOLit + β2CLOSEit+ β3STDEVi + β4COMPt + εit,     (1) 
 
where SPREADit is either the natural log of the absolute bid-ask spread or relative spread 
[(bid+ask)/(bid+ask/2)] for security i on day t. The volume and closing price variables, VOLit and 
CLOSEit, are measured as the natural log of the NYSE daily volume and closing price for security 
i on day t. Volatility, STDEVi, is defined as the standard deviation of the natural log of security 
i’s return over the entire sample period. To determine the effect of stock market competition, 
COMPt is a dummy variable that takes the value of one in the period beginning with the initiation 
of trading of NYSE listed stocks by the Consolidated on February 17, 1885. The white noise error 
term is given by εit. Bid-ask spreads for the empirical analysis are collected from The New York 
Times. The newspaper also reported trading volume, but not information on bid-ask spreads for 
the Consolidated. Silber (2005) reports a similar non-reporting of data on NYSE competitors by 
major financial newspapers in his analysis of the closure of stock markets from the end of July to 
December 1914 following the outbreak of World War I. 
  The time period for the analysis is 60 weeks before and 60 weeks after the onset of 
Consolidated competition. This time interval is determined in part by data availability. As noted 
in the Data Appendix, our firm-level data on volume and bid-ask spreads come from The New 
York Times. The newspaper temporarily discontinued reporting NYSE bid-ask spreads in mid-
  11April 1886. To have a continuous database, we use the interval from February 17, 1885, to April 
9, 1886, for the Consolidated period. We use a comparable interval prior to the onset of off-
exchange trading of NYSE listings as our pre-Consolidated time period. 
  We sampled data from Friday trading in each of the 60 weeks before and the 60 weeks 
after the onset of competition by the Consolidated. If Friday was not a trading day, we sampled 
from an adjacent day. For each day, we collected data on the closing price, volume, and bid-ask 
spreads of all NYSE common stocks reported in The New York Times. Our analysis focuses on 
NYSE-listed firms with non-zero trading volume, although our results are robust to including 
NYSE firms with zero trading volume on a given business day.
7 For the same time interval, we 
also collected control variables reflecting aggregate market conditions such as aggregate NYSE 
volume, the concentration of NYSE trading, and broker call rates. 
  The first panel in Table 7 provides summary statistics for the pre- and Consolidated 
periods. The sample contains 7,036 observations. This includes all companies with at least 12 
observations of reported trading volume and bid-ask spreads on the NYSE.  The mean absolute 
bid-ask spread and relative bid-ask spread are 0.685 and 2.78 percent respectively. The individual 
daily security volume ranges from five shares to 171,516 shares and averages 5,251 shares. The 
mean closing price is $52.89. The standard deviation of returns for the average security is 7.10 
percent per week over the sample period. The number of observations that occur in the 
Consolidated period accounts for 53.4 percent of the total observations. 
Table 7 also reports summary data on the control variables that we use in our robustness 
analysis. The mean aggregate weekly trading volume for all securities on the NYSE during the 
week is 1,990,360 shares. The mean share of total volume was 1.69 percent for securities with 
NYSE volume and the average concentration ratio for the four highest volume NYSE securities is 
55.5 percent, indicating that NYSE volume was highly concentrated among the most active 
                                                 
7 The robustness checks are available from the authors upon request. 
  12securities over the sample period.  The concentration of trading in securities markets has been 
noted in modern day markets by Easley, Kiefer, O’Hara and Paperman (1996). 
The second and third panels in Table 7 separately report the data for the pre- and 
Consolidated periods. The data suggest an average decline in both absolute and relative bid-ask 
spreads. For the remaining firm specific and market-wide variables, there does not appear to be a 
discernible trend or pattern in the data. For example, the average of individual NYSE security 
volume declines while the average NYSE stock price is relatively flat. The average of NYSE total 
weekly volume rises while the average broker call rate falls. In addition, we have examined the 
distribution of the spreads across the two periods. There appears to be a shift in the entire 
distribution toward lower spreads and not a change in clustering around the odd eighths (e.g. 
Christie and Schultz (1994)). For example, the proportion of spreads that is at $0.5 or less 
increases from 65.8 percent of the sample in the pre-period to 70.3 percent in the post-period. 
 Figure 1 graphs the average weekly bid-ask spread over the sample period for the NYSE 
and a group of the leading regional exchanges (Baltimore, Boston and Philadelphia).
8 The graph 
is suggestive in two important ways. First, the decline in bid-ask spread is not part of a larger 
trend of lower bid-ask spreads on the NYSE but is specific to the post-Consolidated period. 
Secondly, the lower bid-ask spread seems to be confined to the NYSE and not the regional 
exchanges. It is important to note that while the regional exchanges did trade some NYSE listed 
securities at this time, the majority of stocks trading on these exchanges were not listed on the Big 
Board and did not face direct competition from the Consolidated.
  
                                                 
8 The Commercial and Financial Chronicle reported bid-ask spreads for some stocks on the regional 
exchanges that did not have trading volume for that particular day.  For consistency, the average bid-ask 
spread for the NYSE is the average for all securities and includes some stocks that did not have any trading 
volume so the data in this figure are not directly comparable to those in later tables. For a couple of weeks 
when The Commercial and Financial Chronicle did not report bid-ask spreads for the regional markets, we 
interpolated the average bid-ask spread using the week before and after the missing observations. The 
Boston Exchange accounts for over 90 percent of the observations in Figure 1. For our formal analysis, we 
are forced to focus on the Boston Exchange due to the lack of sufficient observations with trading volume 
on the other regional exchanges. 
  13 In addition, we present summary statistics in Table 8 for securities with volume on the 
NYSE. The descriptive statistics are broken down into two groups: stocks traded by the 
Consolidated and securities not traded by the rival exchange. For the entire sample period, 
companies that the Consolidated traded accounted for 4,823 out of the 7,036 observations or 68.5 
percent of the sample. However, the average volume of securities traded by the Consolidated was 
over 17 times higher than the NYSE listings that they did not trade.  The companies that the 
Consolidated traded accounted for over 97 percent of the total trading volume over the full 
sample period. In addition to having lower volumes and lower bid-ask spreads in both the full 
period and the pre-Consolidated securities, the securities traded by the Consolidated tended to 
have lower average closing prices and higher volatility.  
If we examine the change from the pre-Consolidated period to the Consolidated period 
for each group, then it is clear that the bid-ask spreads and relative bid-ask spreads fall for each 
group. The decline in spreads for the group with Consolidated trading is consistent with 
competition and the decline in the group without Consolidated trading is consistent with potential 
competition. On the other hand, the mean bid-ask spread for the regional exchanges did not 
experience a similar decline with the onset of stock market competition between the two New 
York exchanges. In addition, the group with Consolidated trading experienced a decline in the 
average NYSE volume of almost 15 percent (8,102 shares vs. 6,883 shares) while the volume for 
those without Consolidated trading increased by 25 percent in the period of competition (382 
shares vs. 478 shares). Table 9 reports the results for the estimation of our basic model over the 
pre- and Consolidated period. We report four specifications that examine the determinants of the 
absolute and relative bid-ask spreads that omit and include company fixed effects. Column A of 
Table 9 reports the model with the absolute bid-ask spread as the dependent variable. The results 
indicate that the absolute spread is positively related to the closing price, negatively related to 
individual security volume, and positively related to the standard deviation of returns. All 
coefficients are significant at the one percent level of significance. 
  14The dummy variable for the presence of Consolidated trading indicates that absolute 
spreads are negatively related to the onset of competition from the Consolidated exchange. The 
coefficient on the Consolidated dummy is also significant at the one percent level. The results 
suggest that the bid-ask spreads were approximately 11.6 (e
-.123-1) percent lower in the 
Consolidated period.  
In Column B of Table 9, we include company specific fixed effects to capture 
unobserved heterogeneity across firms. This necessitates excluding the standard deviation 
variable because it does not vary by observation across an individual security. The coefficients on 
security volume and the Consolidated dummy remain negative and significant at the one percent 
level and the coefficient estimate rises to 14.3 percent. The closing price is now negatively and 
significantly related to absolute spreads after controlling for fixed effects.   
Column C of Table 9 reports the results using the relative spread as the dependent 
variable. Higher security volume, higher closing prices, and higher volatility are all negatively 
and significantly related to the relative spread. The presence of the Consolidated results in a 
reduction in relative spreads of approximately 11.3 (e
-.120-1) percent. We obtain similar results 
when we control for company specific fixed effects in Column D. 
The ideal test of the effects of the Consolidated would be to have a control group  of 
actively traded securities on the NYSE that had some prohibition on Consolidated trading. 
Without such a control group, we estimate models similar to those presented in Table 9 for the 
Boston Stock Exchange in order to determine whether or not the results are driven by overall 
changes in equity markets during this time period. The Boston Stock Exchange serves the 
purpose as a quasi-control group because it predominantly traded different stocks in the same 
industry --railroad and telephone stocks-- that did not trade on the Big Board. Moreover, the New 
York financial press regularly printed a list of stock prices on the Boston Stock Exchange. The 
regional exchange therefore provides a test of whether a railroad or telephone specific shock can 
account for the statistically significant decline in NYSE bid-ask spreads with the Consolidated’s 
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indicate a similar relationship between spreads and control variables. However, the dummy 
variable for the presence of Consolidated trading is never significantly different than zero. 
Although the coefficient for competition is negative for Boston, it is less than half the size of the 
competition coefficient for the NYSE. This suggests that the observed relationship between 
Consolidated trading and NYSE spreads was the result of competition.  
While the analysis in Table 9 controls for individual security effects across the pre- and 
Consolidated time periods, it is possible that changes in overall market conditions rather than the 
existence of the Consolidated led to lower bid-ask spreads. We control for overall market 
conditions with several variables including aggregate NYSE volume, the concentration of trading 
volume, and the broker call rate. Our measure of aggregate volume, WVOLt, is NYSE weekly 
volume for a given observation (the sum of total NYSE volume for the day included in the 
sample and the five previous days of trading). Davis, Neal and White (2005) find that higher total 
volume on the NYSE increases bid-ask spreads if the “Big Board” has reached its capacity 
constraint for trading stocks. We also include the concentration ratio of volume for the four 
highest volume firms, CONCt, to account for the fact that high volume securities have lower bid-
ask spreads – if trading becomes more concentrated in high volume securities, then bid-ask 
spreads should fall. We also include the ratio of a security’s NYSE volume to total NYSE volume 
on that day, SHAREit, to control for the extent to which the Consolidated was trading only the 
most active NYSE securities. Finally, we include the broker’s call rate as a measure of the cost of 
carrying an inventory of securities. The white noise error term is given by εit. The extended model 
can be written as: 
SPREADit = α0+ β1VOLit + β2CLOSEit+ β3STDEVi +  β4COMPt + β5WVOLit + β6CALLt 
+ β7SHAREit + β8CONCt + εit        ( 2 )  
In Table 10 we report the results of estimating the model with the additional control 
variables. While each of these additional variables is generally significant in the regression, they 
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individual security volume measure. The individual security volume variable is no longer 
significantly different from zero because the variable is highly correlated with total NYSE 
volume.  
In all the specifications reported in Table 10, the presence of competition from the 
Consolidated is associated with a reduction in absolute and relative spreads of approximately 13 
percent. The Consolidated dummy is significant at the one percent level in the four different 
specifications. Moreover, the impact of the Consolidated on spreads is remarkably consistent 
across the specifications presented in Tables 9 and 10 and indicates that the introduction of the 
Consolidated is associated with a non-trivial reduction in bid-ask spreads on the NYSE.  Table 
10A reports an analysis of bid-ask spreads for the Boston Exchange using additional control 
variables. Again, we find that bid-ask spreads on the regional exchange did not significantly 
decline when the Consolidated Stock Exchange began to trade NYSE-listed stocks. 
The baseline results are also consistent across a series of robustness checks not reported. 
We obtained similar findings when we included every security from The New York Times rather 
than focusing only on securities with positive NYSE volume on a given day. We also estimated 
the model after excluding securities that appeared only in the pre- or Consolidated period and 
have also restricted the sample to only those firms that consistently traded in both periods, 
something akin to a matched panel. The results are unaffected by these changes. The results are 
also robust to excluding securities with closing prices of $1 or less and $5 or less. Finally, we 
obtain similar results if we exclude securities trading at the binding spread of one-eighth.  
 
B. The Effects of Long-Run Competition 
  As a complement to the short-run analysis, we also study the long-run effect of 
competition on NYSE bid-ask spreads. We estimate a panel regression of NYSE bid-ask spreads 
on variables proxying for competition from the Consolidated, firm-specific variables that affect 
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brief lapse in reporting trading volume of NYSE stocks on the Consolidated from April through 
August 1886 limits our long-run analysis to the period September 1886 to February 1926. We 
sampled data from the last trading day of each month for the analysis. We collected firm-specific 
information on bid-ask spreads, trading volume on the NYSE, and trading volume of NYSE 
stocks bought and sold on the Consolidated Stock Exchange (if any). We also collected data on 
NYSE total monthly volume and the closing monthly broker call rate as additional control 
variables for the empirical analysis. 
We focus our analysis on the common stocks in the Dow Jones Indices. We use the 
original Dow Jones Index with 12 stocks from September 1886 until October 1896, when the 
index is divided into the 20 stock Dow Jones Railroad Index and the 12 stock Industrial Index. 
We collected data from The New York Times for each security in the index at a given point in 
time and rely on Farrell (1972) for changes in the composition of the indices.  
We employ the same empirical analysis used in Section 2 where the natural log of the 
absolute or relative spread is a function of a security’s volume, its closing price, individual 
security volatility and competition. The only difference in the specification is that we now 
employ two different measures for the competition variable. The first is an estimate of the 
Consolidated’s fraction of the volume of trading in a given NYSE listing, defined as 
[Consolidated Volume/(NYSE Volume + Consolidated Volume)]. Since this variable is measured 
in logs, we replace all zeros with a small positive value before taking the natural log for the 
observations where the Consolidated’s share is zero. The basic tenor of the results remains 
unchanged by including shares with a zero value. The second measure of competition is a dummy 
variable that takes a value of one if a security traded on the Consolidated on a given day. The two 
measures of competition have a pair wise correlation of 0.95, so we do not use them in the same 
regression. 
  18  Table 11 reports the summary statistics for the data used in the analysis of the effects of 
the Consolidated over time. The absolute bid-ask spread averages 0.414 and the relative bid-ask 
spread averages 0.627 percent. These bid-ask spread values are lower than those reported for all 
NYSE stocks in Table 5, which reflects the fact that the firms in the Dow Jones Indices are 
relatively liquid. Individual daily security volume on the NYSE averages 10,626 shares, the 
closing price averages $88.239, and individual security return volatility over the entire sample 
period averages 11.348.  
The Consolidated’s share of total volume per security averages 11.21 percent, but ranges 
from zero to 99.5 percent. For the dataset of firms from the Dow Jones Index, the Consolidated 
traded in an average of 74.8 percent of the sample on a given day. Table 11 also reports summary 
statistics on the control variables used in the analysis. NYSE total monthly volume averages 14.7 
million shares. A security’s share of trading volume averages 3.742 percent and the concentration 
of trading in the four most heavily traded securities averages 63 percent. The broker’s call rate 
averages four percent. 
  Table 12 reports the estimates of the basic model of the effects of the Consolidated over 
time. The first two columns report the model with the absolute bid-ask spread as the dependent 
variable. The first column has the natural log of Consolidated share as the measure of 
competition, while the second column has the simple Consolidated dummy as the measure of 
competition. Both the Consolidated share variable and the dummy variable for the presence of 
any Consolidated trading are negatively and significantly related to bid-ask spreads at the one 
percent level. A one percent increase in the share of the Consolidated volume results in a 3.6 
percent decline in the absolute and relative bid-ask spreads and the presence of Consolidated 
trading reduces the bid-ask spread by about 20 (e
-.225-1)  percent. The coefficients of volume, 
price level, and security volatility all have the expected signs and are significantly different from 
zero. The next two columns report the basic model with the relative bid-ask spread as the 
dependent variable. Again, the two measures of competition are negatively and significantly 
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signs and are significantly different from zero. 
Table 12 also presents the results when we control for security specific fixed effects and 
year effects. Here the variable for individual security volatility is omitted because it is estimated 
over the entire sample period for a given firm. The results are generally robust to changing the 
specification of the model with the Consolidated share variable producing a 2.8 percent to 3.0 
percent reduction in spreads and the presence of Consolidated trading producing a decline in 
spreads of approximately 15 (e
-.163 -1) percent. 
  We also estimate the extended model --given in equation (2)-- that incorporates 
additional control variables to capture general market conditions. Table 13 presents the empirical 
results using the additional control variables with and without fixed effects. The competition 
variables always have a negative and statistically significant effect on spreads. Hence, both the 
presence and magnitude of competition by the Consolidated is associated with narrower bid-ask 
spreads on the NYSE over time. 
  As a complement to our long-run analysis, we also conducted an “event study” analysis 
of the effects of the initiation of trading by the Consolidated in a particular stock. To conduct this 
test, we searched for securities from our sample of Dow Index stocks that had distinct trading on 
the NYSE before also trading on the Consolidated. We then estimated the change in bid-ask 
spreads of the securities after the initiation of trading by the Consolidated. Unfortunately, most 
stocks that were in the Dow Indices tended to have heavy trading on both the NYSE and the 
Consolidated during the course of our sample period. 
We identified four securities that fit our criterion: AT&T, Colorado Fuel & Iron, and the 
Texas Company. We use these four stocks and estimate our baseline model where the dummy 
variable for the Consolidated is equal to one after the Consolidated initiates trading. We find that 
the initiation of Consolidated trading is significantly related to a decline in spreads, which is 
consistent with our other analysis. However, the results only reflect a small sample of stocks.  
  20 
C. The End of the Consolidated 
Another test of the effects of stock market competition is to examine how bid-ask spreads 
changed when the Consolidated ceased to be an important competitor. However, the gradual 
decline of the rival exchange --as opposed to an abrupt halt of trading on the Consolidated--
makes it difficult to identify the effects of the removal of competition on bid-ask spreads. 
Nevertheless, we attempt to provide some insight into this question by using the resignation of 
William Silkworth, President of the Consolidated Stock Exchange, on June 25, 1923 as a key 
event that signaled the demise of the rival exchange. At this time, the New York State Attorney 
General also closed several brokerage houses affiliated with the Consolidated. The NYSE began 
considering measures to enforce its ownership of the price quotes by removing its tickers from 
the Consolidated. If we re-estimate the long-run models presented in Tables 12 and 13 and restrict 
the sample to the period after Silkworth resigns, the two competition variables are not statistically 
significant in the baseline or extended models.  The results suggest that the Consolidated ceased 
to be a significant competitor after June 1923.
9  
The mean bid-ask spreads also increase from $0.41 to $0.45 in the post-Silkworth period 
with the fraction of absolute spreads at $0.5 or less decreasing from 83.7 percent of the sample to 
77.9 percent of the sample. The data suggest that the rise in bid-ask spreads is of similar 
magnitude to the decline in spreads observed at the initiation of Consolidated trading.  We also 
re-estimated the baseline and extended models over the 40-year panel, replacing our measures of 
competition with a dummy variable that takes the value of one after June 1923 and the value of 
zero for the earlier months. The results presented in Tables 14 indicate that bid-ask spreads 
increased after June 1923. The results for the baseline model indicate a positive and significant 
coefficient on the post-Silkworth dummy for both absolute and relative spreads. The coefficient 
on the end-of-competition variable in the models without company fixed effects is remarkably 
                                                 
9 These results are available from the authors on request. 
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trading. The results with fixed effects produce smaller relative coefficients, but still indicate that 
the demise of the Consolidated was accompanied by a statistically significant increase in bid-ask 
spreads.  
The results are not as robust for the extended model. The coefficient estimates are 
statistically significant but the coefficient estimates are smaller when we do not control for 
company specific fixed effects. The results are positive but not statistically significant when we 
control for company specific factors. However, it is important to note that these results are 
achieved without a well defined end date for the Consolidated. As noted earlier, the 
Consolidated’s share of total volume was decreasing in the second half of the sample period and 
as such one would expect its end would produce smaller effects than its beginning. The fact that 
the onset of competition was associated with a large rise in the Consolidated’s market share while 
the demise of the exchange coincided with a gradual decline in market share makes finding any 
result at the end of the exchange less likely.  
  Overall, we interpret the empirical analysis as strong evidence that head-to-head 
competition between the Consolidated and the NYSE lowered bid-ask spreads on the Big Board. 
NYSE bid-ask spreads fell with the onset of competition and increased when the Consolidated 
ceased to be an important competitor. Moreover, the coefficients on the two competition variables 
in the 40-year panel models are quite consistent across the different specifications, suggesting that 
the analysis does not suffer from an omitted variable. For an omitted variable to explain the 
results, it would have to cause NYSE bid-ask spreads to suddenly fall in 1885, rise from 1923 
until February 1926, and be uncorrelated with the two measures of competition in the 40-year 
panel model. This seems unlikely given the historical and empirical evidence.     
D. Price Discovery 
Beginning July 7, 1912, the Consolidated opened 30 minutes (9:30AM) before the 
NYSE. The Consolidated used a call market to establish opening prices in this period. The 
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outbreak of World War I.  When the two rival exchanges reopened on December 12, 1914, the 
Consolidated apparently resumed trading at 10:00AM given that the financial press no longer 
reported trading activity on the rival exchange in the half hour before the start of NYSE trading. 
This two-year window provides an opportunity to test whether the Consolidated contributed to 
the price discovery process given that we lack detailed transaction level data to perform a more 
rigorous analysis. We employ a technique used by Silber (2006) to determine the extent to which 
opening prices on the Consolidated contained new information that would be incorporated into 
NYSE opening prices. Our variant of Silber’s model can be written as follows: 
 
NYSEOPENit = α0 + β1NYSECLOSEit-1 + β2CONSOLIDATEDOPENit + εit (3). 
 
Equation (3) tests whether opening prices on the Consolidated predict opening prices on the 
NYSE after controlling for closing prices on the Big Board from the previous day. We collected 
weekly data for Friday’s opening price and Thursday’s closing price for all stocks that traded on 
the Consolidated and the NYSE. Then we matched stocks with a Friday opening price on the 
NYSE, NYSEOPENit, with securities that had a Friday opening price on the Consolidated, 
CONSOLIDATEDOPENit, and a Thursday closing price for the NYSE, NYSECLOSEit. The 
estimated coefficients along with robust standard errors are presented below. The model was 
estimated with 3,604 observations. 
 
NYSEOPENit = -0.006 + 0.304NYSECLOSEit-1 + 0.695CONSOLIDATEDOPENit  
       (0.006)  (0.032)      (0.032)   R
2 = 0.99 
The slope coefficients are significant at the one percent level. The coefficient for the opening 
price of the Consolidated is more than two times larger than the coefficient on NYSE closing 
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process and was more than a free-riding exchange that traded off NYSE bid-ask quotes. 
  As a robustness check, we also estimate the model in returns where it is  written as: 
 
NYSERETURNit = α0 + β1CONSOLIDATEDRETURNit + εit (4) 
 
 
where NYSERETURNit = log(NYSEOPENit) - log(NYSECLOSEit-1) and  
CONSOLIDATEDRETURNit = log(CONSOLIDATEDOPENit) - log(NYSECLOSEit-1). The 
estimated coefficients and standard errors are: 
 
NYSERETURNit = -0.0003 + 0.277 CONSOLIDATEDRETURNit + εit  
            (0.001)  (0.043)   R
2 = 0.123 
 
The coefficient on the Consolidated return is significant at the 1 percent level. The point estimate 
on the Consolidated variable implies that the change between the NYSE closing price and the 
Consolidated opening price accounts for just over 50 percent of the total overnight return for a 
security on the NYSE. Again, this suggests that the Consolidated was capable of some form of 
price discovery. One concern with the results is that many stocks that traded on the NYSE also 
traded in London during the overnight period. If this were true, then opening stock prices on the 
Consolidated may just reflect information generated in the London market. To address this 
concern, we identified the securities that traded in London from The Economist and The Times. 
Excluding stocks that traded on the London market did not change the empirical results.
10 
Moreover, the analysis also indicates that approximately 5 percent of the securities that traded on 
the Consolidated did not trade on the London market or the NYSE on a given day. Although these 
                                                 
10 If we exclude the stocks that also traded in London, then the coefficient on the Consolidated in equation 
(3) drops to 0.611 and rises to .294 in equation (4). The coefficient estimates are still significant at the one 
percent level. 
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that the Consolidated functioned as a primary market for some securities. 
 
 4. Summary and Conclusion 
In this paper we study the magnitude, nature, and effects of the rivalry between the 
NYSE and the Consolidated Stock Exchange. The Consolidated competed directly with the 
NYSE for 42 years and garnered an annual market share as high as 60 percent of the Big Board’s 
listings. The Consolidated focused on the relatively more liquid NYSE listings as measured by 
bid-ask spreads and trading volume. Both the onset of competition by the Consolidated and the 
trading on the Consolidated over time are associated with narrower bid-ask spreads on the NYSE.  
This episode of a sustained, established rivalry with the NYSE suggests that historical 
perceptions about the NYSE should be revisited. The large market share obtained by the 
Consolidated over a lengthy period of time indicates that the NYSE has not been impervious to 
competition. This stands in marked contrast to conventional wisdom (e.g., Doede (1967)) that the 
NYSE was historically a natural monopoly. Similarly, a recent history of the NYSE states, “But 
for most of the New York Stock Exchange’s existence it has so dominated securities markets that 
it can be said to have faced no real competition.” (Blume, Siegel and Rottenberg (1993, p.25). 
Such perceived structural features of the NYSE should be reconsidered given the length and 
depth of the rivalry from the Consolidated.  
The nature of the competition by the Consolidated also has important lessons for today’s 
securities markets. Consistent with modern day competitors, the Consolidated focused its rivalry 
on the relatively more liquid listings of the NYSE (, e.g., Easley, Kiefer and O’Hara (1996), 
Battalio (1997).) We also find that the NYSE responded to competition by narrowing its bid-ask 
spreads. Our estimates indicate that the onset of head-to-head competition was associated with 
more than a 10 percent reduction in NYSE bid-ask spreads while bid-ask spreads for our quasi-
control group of stocks on the Boston Stock Exchange did not significantly change. The effect 
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scandals and investigations by the New York State Attorney General’s Office led to the demise of 
the Consolidated. The results also suggest that the Consolidated may have improved the 
efficiency of stock prices by contributing to the price discovery process.  
A more general lesson from the Consolidated rivalry is the resiliency of the NYSE. The 
Big Board survived the onslaught of a significant competitor. The reaction to the Consolidated is 
but one of the many responses by the NYSE to changing conditions in securities markets over 
time. Banner (1998) discusses the early success of the NYSE. Garvy (1944) details how the 
NYSE facilitated a merger in the mid-19
th century to maintain its competitive position. Jarrell 
(1984) describes the rise of institutional investors and the other forces at play in the removal of 
fixed brokerage commissions on the NYSE in the mid-1970s. The merger between Archipelago 
and the NYSE may prove to be one more example of the Big Board’s resiliency. 
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  29Data Appendix 
In this Appendix, we describe the sources for and the availability of the main variables in 
our analysis: Aggregate New York Stock Exchange trading volume, aggregate Consolidated Stock 
Exchange trading volume, average New York Stock Exchange bid-ask spreads, as well as firm-
specific data on NYSE bid-ask spreads, NYSE volume, and the volume on the Consolidated Stock 
Exchange of NYSE listings. 
 
Aggregate New York Stock Exchange Trading Volume 
Aggregate trading volume for the New York Stock Exchange comes from two sources, the 
New York Times and the website of the NYSE. For the years 1875 through 1887, the data are hand 
collected on a daily basis from the New York Times. For 1888 to 1926, the data are taken from the 
website of the NYSE. The data for 1926 are for January and February only. The only interruption in 
the data is the period from July 31, 1914, through December 11, 1914, when the NYSE closed 
during World War 1. 
 
Aggregate Consolidated Stock Exchange Trading Volume 
Data on aggregate trading volume for the Consolidated Stock Exchange are hand collected 
from the New York Times. The data begin on February 17, 1885, when the New York Times 
separately reports NYSE-listed stocks within the volume for the New York Mining Exchange. As of 
Monday March 9, 1885, the New York Times reports the sales of NYSE-listed stocks under the 
name of the Consolidated Petroleum Exchange Board. For a brief time in 1886, the New York Times 
does not report the trading of NYSE-listed stocks on the Consolidated Exchange. The lapse in 
reporting occurs between April 15, 1886 and September 4, 1886. The last day the New York Times 
reports trading volume for the Consolidated Stock Exchange is February 16, 1926. 
 
Average New York Stock Exchange Bid-Ask Spreads 
  30Bid-ask spread data for the New York Stock Exchange are taken primarily from the New 
York Times. The Commercial and Financial Chronicle serves as a secondary source for certain 
years when the New York Times did not report bid-ask spreads. 
Our analysis of NYSE bid-ask spreads reports average estimates for a single day for the 
years 1875 to 1926. The date chosen for analysis tended to be at the end of January or the beginning 
of February of a given year, although there were some exceptions based on data availability. 
Appendix Table A sketches the dates and sources for this data. For 1875 to 1881, the New York 
Times reports bid-ask spreads for Saturday trading on the following Monday. These data on spreads 
are matched with the data for Saturday trading volume that is reported in the Sunday New York 
Times. 
Beginning on May 24, 1882, the New York Times reports NYSE bid-ask spreads on a 
daily basis. The data on daily bid-ask spreads continue through April 14, 1886. Between April 15, 
1886, and May 12, 1893, the New York Times does not report bid-ask spreads for the NYSE. In this 
time interval, we gather bid-ask spread data from the Commercial and Financial Chronicle. The 
bid-ask spread data are reported for Thursday trading and are matched with the appropriate trading 
volume data from the New York Times. 
On May 13, 1893, the New York Times resumes reporting of NYSE bid-ask spreads 
on a daily basis. These data are used through February 1926. 
Firm-Specific Data 
  We also employ firm specific data on NYSE bid-ask spreads, NYSE volume, and the 
volume of NYSE-listings on the Consolidated Stock Exchange. The data are taken from the 
New York Times. 
  31Appendix Table A. Overview of Average Bid-Ask Spread Data 
Year Calendar  Date  Day of Week Data  Source 
1875  January 23  Saturday  New York Times 
1876  January 22  Saturday  New York Times 
1877 January 27  Saturday New York Times 
1878 January 26  Saturday New York Times 
1879 February l  Saturday New York Times 
1880 February 2  Saturday New York Times 
1881 January 29  Saturday New York Times 
1882  May 26  Friday  New York Times 
1883 January 26  Friday New York Times 
1884 January 18  Friday New York Times 
1885  March 31  Tuesday  New York Times 
1886 January 29  Friday New York Times 
1887 February 3  Thursday Commercial and Financial Chronicle
1888 February 2  Thursday Commercial and Financial Chronicle
1889 February 14  Thursday Commercial and Financial Chronicle
1890 February 13  Thursday Commercial and Financial Chronicle
1891 February  19  Thursday  Commercial and Financial Chronicle 
1892 February  18  Thursday  Commercial and Financial Chronicle 
1893 June  30  Thursday New York Times 
1894 January 31  Wednesday New York Times 
1895 January 31  Thursday New York Times 
1896 January 31  Friday New York Times 
1897 January 29  Friday New York Times 
1898  January 31  Monday  New York Times 
1899 January 31  Tuesday New York Times 
1900 January 31  Wednesday New York Times 
1901 January 31  Thursday New York Times 
1902 January 31  Friday New York Times 
1903  January 30  Friday  New York Times 
1904 January 29  Friday New York Times 
1905 January 31  Tuesday New York Times 
1906 January 31  Wednesday New York Times 
1907 January 31  Thursday New York Times 
1908 January 31  Friday New York Times 
1909 January 29  Friday New York Times 
1910 January 31  Monday New York Times 
1911  January 31  Tuesday  New York Times 
1912 January 31  Wednesday New York Times 
1913  January 31  Friday  New York Times 
1914 January 30  Friday New York Times 
1915 January 29  Friday New York Times 
1916 January 31  Monday New York Times 
1917 January 31  Wednesday New York Times 
1918 January 31  Thursday New York Times 
1919 January 31  Friday New York Times 
1920 January 30  Friday New York Times 
1921  January 31  Monday  New York Times 
1922 January 31  Tuesday New York Times 
1923 January 31  Wednesday New York Times 
  321924  January 31  Thursday  New York Times 
1925 January 30  Friday New York Times 
1926  January 29  Friday  New York Times 
 
  33Appendix of News Articles 
This Appendix provides background from news articles on the New York Stock Exchange, the 
Consolidated Stock Exchange, and the rivalry between the two exchanges. The news articles 
are presented in chronological order. 
"The Stock Brokers Latest Trouble," New York Times, December 11, 1877. 
 
The recently established "bucket-shops," or blackboard exchanges, where stock gambling on 
margins from ½ percent upward and in sums as low as $5 is allowed, have increased so rapidly 
and have been doing so large a business as to cause great annoyance to the smaller class of 
brokers from the New York Stock Exchange, who naturally suspect them of drawing away a 
goodly portion of their legitimate customers. 
 
 
"War Against the Bucket Shops," New York Times, September 3, 1884. 
 
Members of the Stock Exchange propose to institute an organized warfare against the "bucket 
shops," which are alleged to thrive only because of their ability to get prompt stock quotations 
from the Exchange board room... Efforts will be made to protect members of the Exchange by 
preventing the news of the board room from falling into the hands of persons who are not 
members of the Exchange. 
 
 
"The Exchanges at Odds," New York Times, January 21, 1885. 
 
The action of the Mining Stock and National Petroleum Exchange in requesting its Governing 
Committee to amend the constitution so that securities listed in the Stock Exchange may be dealt 
in has caused much comment. About 230 members of the Stock Exchange are members of the 
Mining Board. The by-laws of the Stock Exchange prohibit members of that organization from 
belonging to any other New-York Exchange in which stocks and bonds (except unlisted 
securities) are dealt in. 
 
 
"A Rival to the Stock Exchange," New York Times, February 14, 1885. 
 
The announcement by the President of the New-York Mining Stock and National Petroleum 
Exchange yesterday that hereafter all securities listed on the Stock Exchange would be dealt in by 
members of the first-named Exchange were greeted by mingled applause and groans.... Some of 
the members of the Stock Exchange were very indignant at what they were pleased to call "a 
breach of faith" on the part of the Mining Board. The fact was recalled that two to three years ago 
an official letter was sent to the Stock Exchange from the Mining Board that under no 
circumstances would listed securities be traded in that last-named Exchange and inviting Stock 
Exchange men to join the newer body. 
 
"Stock Exchange Rivalry," New York Times, February 15, 1885. 
 
A petition was circulated in the board room of the Stock Exchange yesterday asking the 
Governing Committee to set apart that portion of the floor now used for loan transactions for the 
purpose of trading in fractional lots of listed stocks, oil certificates, and miscellaneous securities. 
  34That proposition is made in retaliation for the action of the Mining Board in undertaking to deal 
in securities which are on the stock Exchange list 
 
 
"Competition in Tickers," New York Times, March 11, 1885. 
 
Including the Commercial Telegram Company, there are now three companies organized in this 
city to distribute stock and other quotations. The Gold and Stock Company has about 1,600 
instruments in New York alone which are used exclusively for stock quotations. 
 
 
"A Broker to be Tried for Violating a Stock Exchange Rule," New York Times, March 11, 1887. 
 
James G. Hamilton, a member of the Stock Exchange since 1879, will be put on trial by the 
Governing Committee Thursday of next week for violating a rule which the Governing 
Committee is anxious to see rigidly enforced. For the express purpose of preventing what it is 
alleged Mr. Hamilton has done, the Governing Committee, March 24 of last year, adopted the 
following resolutions: That the members of this Exchange be forbidden to have direct or indirect 
telegraphic or telephonic communication with the Consolidated Stock and Petroleum Exchange 
and that the Committee of Arrangements be directed to enforce this rule. 
 
 
"Quotations Public Property," New York Times, May 8, 1887. 
 
There was jubilee on the Consolidated Stock and Petroleum Exchange yesterday, news arriving 
that Judge Dykeman, at White Plains, had decided the long-fought battle over tickers and 
quotations in favor of the Consolidated Exchange and against the Stock Exchange... The Stock 
Exchange sought to keep a ticker company from supplying the stock market quotations to the 
Consolidated Exchange; the latter institution, fighting for its very life, obtained an injunction 




"Broker Morris Suspended," New York Times, May 24, 1888. 
 
The report of the special committee of the Governing Committee of the Stock Exchange in the 
case of Walter S. Morris was submitted yesterday. It dealt elaborately with the testimony on the 
charges that Morris violated his obligations as a member of the Stock Exchange by having 
business relations with a member or members of the Consolidated Exchange... The report 
sustained the charges and with its adoption the Governing Committee voted to suspend Morris 
from the Exchange for one year. 
 
"Stock Exchange Hits Little Board," New York Times, May 21, 1909. 
 
The Stock Exchange authorities made public yesterday resolutions which will cut off its members 
from all business relations with Consolidated Stock Exchange houses... For twenty years the Stock 
Exchange has prohibited direct communications between the two exchanges or their members, and 
perhaps the most active efforts of the successive governing bodies of the Stock Exchange since that 
date have been directed toward the enforcement of this rule, but there has never before been 
anything in the Stock Exchange constitution to prevent ordinary business relations between houses 
of the two exchanges. 
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“No Unlisted Stocks After Next April,” New York Times, July 22, 1909. 
 
The unlisted Department of the New York Stock Exchange, which has been the refuge for many 
companies showing a diffidence about publishing annual statements of their financial condition, 
was abolished yesterday by an announcement issued by the Stock Exchange authorities to take 
effect on April 1, 1910.  
 
 
“Big Exchange wins Little Board Suit,” New York Times, September 5, 1909. 
 
The New York Stock Exchange won a victory yesterday in its fight with the Consolidated 
Exchange when Supreme Court Justice Crane of Brooklyn refused to restrain the big board 
from enforcing its rule forbidding its members to deal with members of the other Exchange, 
on pain of suspension or expulsion. 
 
 
"Asks Little Board to Open Earlier," New York Times, June 19, 1912. 
 
The new administration of the Consolidated Stock Exchange, which went into office last month, has 
“thrown its hat into the ring” in Wall Street, and, according to a circular letter sent to members by 
President M.E. de Aguero, they ought to start right in expanding. The first proposal ...is to begin 
business at 9:30 A.M. instead of 10 o’clock.  … “It will demonstrate beyond question that we are 




"Little Board Calls Stocks," New York Times, July 19, 1912 
 
For the first time in recent years, the system of “calling” stocks for trading was used yesterday when 
the Consolidated Stock Exchange opened for trading at  9:30 instead of 10 o’clock … Only the 
most active stocks on the list, some seventeen issues, are included in the call. 
 
 
"Signs Exchange Bills," New York Times, May 13, 1913 
 
Three Stock Exchange Bills were signed by Gov. Sulzer today. … The third prohibits the New 
York Stock Exchange from discriminating against members of other Exchanges. This last bill was 
asked for by the New York Consolidated Exchange. 
 
 
"Exchanges on Good Terms," New York Times, June 26, 1913. 
 
The Board of Governors of the New York Stock Exchange, at their last meeting yesterday before 
the Summer recess, rescinded those sections of the constitution of the Exchange which forbade 
members to have any dealings with the Consolidated Stock Exchange. This is in accord with the 
law past by the Legislature early last month ….  
 
 
"Asks State Inquiry Into Bucket Charge,” New York Times, April 28, 1923. 
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Henry W. Sykes, a lawyer, who said he was acting for a group of lawyers interested in many recent 
failures of brokerage firms, yesterday sent a letter to Attorney General Carl Sherman requesting a 
conference with him with a view to impressing him with the need for an immediate investigation of 
allegations that the Consolidated Stock Exchange was the headquarters of bucket shop operations.  
 
 
"State Opens War on Stock Frauds; Closes 10 Concerns,” New York Times, June 9, 1923. 
 
The State of New York stepped into the bucket shop situation yesterday. Attorney General Carl 
Sherman said he would wipe out as many of the financial highway man as were on his blacklist and 
then go after others. …  Mr. Sherman announced his intention to take part in investigations now 
being carried out by the Curb and Consolidated Exchange into the business methods of some of 
their members.  
 
 
"May Cut Off Ticker Service," New York Times, June 16, 1923. 
 
The Law Committee of the New York Stock Exchange is discussing ways and means of 
discontinuing its ticker service which furnishes the Consolidated Exchange with the quotations 
established on the floor of the "big board".... The question of supplying the Consolidated with the 
ticker service as is supplied to its members and other brokerage firms has been a bone of contention 
between the two organizations for more than thirty years. About thirty years ago the Stock 
Exchange authorities attempted to remove the tickers from the floor of the Consolidated, which 
protested and took the matter to court. A permanent injunction was granted prohibiting the Stock 
Exchange from cutting off the ticker service. This injunction has been in force ever since although 
several attempts have been made to have it vacated... While opinion is virtually unanimous in Stock 
Exchange circles that the Consolidated would not survive if the Stock Exchange removed the 
tickers many members favor immediate discontinuance because of the recent sensational 
developments and bucket shop failures. 
 
 
"Silkworth Resigns from Consolidated and Sells His Seat," New York Times, June 26, 1923. 
 
William S. Silkworth, President of the Consolidated Stock Exchange, yesterday resigned to take 
effect today... The resignation of Mr. Silkworth and the severing of his connection with the 
Consolidated Stock Exchange of New York marks another milestone in the long series of 
disagreements between members of the Exchange and its officials, which have developed in the 




"To Start Trading in 80 Mining Stocks," New York Times, June 1, 1925. 
 
The Consolidated Stock Exchange of New York will start trading today the shares of eighty 
mining companies which have been admitted to the Exchange’s list. 
 
 
"U.S. Inquiry Begun into Tax Dodging by Stock Brokers," New York Times, June 27, 1925. 
 
  37The Internal Revenue Bureau of the Treasury Department has launched a searching investigation, 
it was learned yesterday, to determine whether the Federal Government has lost hundreds of 
thousands of dollars in the last two years from the failure of some members of the Consolidated 
Stock Exchange to place tax stamps on stock transfers as required by law. 
 
 
"Plans to Reform Exchange Trading," New York Times, December 31, 1925. 
 
Following postponement yesterday of State Attorney General Albert Ottinger's investigation 
under the Martin Act of stock brokerage houses in this city, Assistant Attorney General Keyes 
Winter, in charge of the inquiry before Supreme Court Justice John Ford, declared his purpose 
not to "abolish" the Consolidated Stock Exchange, but to place upon that organization "such 
restriction as would prevent its facilities from being used for improper and illegal purposes." 
 
 
“May Extend Inquiry into Stock Loans,” New York Times, January 7, 1926. 
 
In the course of inquiry into certain alleged practices of members of the Consolidated Stock 
Exchange yesterday, Supreme Court Justice Ford interrupted the testimony to ask Deputy 
Attorney General Keyes Winter why similar action was not being taken in the case of the 
members of the New York Stock Exchange. Mr. Winter replied that … “if information indicating 
irregularities among members of the New York Stock Exchange is brought out at the present 
hearings, the inquiry will be broadened to take in the big exchange.” 
Mr. Winter’s statement followed a declaration by Justice Ford that he could see no difference 
“between the big exchange and the little one” except that the former had a “better financial 
standing and a greater prestige.” 
 
  
"Injunction Curbs the Consolidated's Trading Practices," New York Times, February 5, 1926. 
 
On application of Attorney General Albert Ottinger, Supreme Court Justice John Ford granted 
yesterday a temporary injunction to refrain the Consolidated Stock Exchange from continuing 
certain practices alleged by the Attorney General to be illegal. 
 
 
“Consolidated May Consent to Close: New Group at Helm” New York Times, February 11, 1926. 
 
With a court hearing, in which it will be decided by Supreme Court Justice John Ford whether a 
receiver shall take charge of the affairs of the Consolidated Stock Exchange impending a group of 
five members literally seized control off the Exchange yesterday.  … This action followed the 
resignation of Thomas B. Maloney, President of the Exchange, to take place Feb, 15, and the 
withdrawal from the case of former Governor Charles S. Whitman. 
 
 
“Consolidated Asks to Close Exchange,” New York Times, March 19, 1926. 
 
A majority of the members of the Consolidated Stock Exchange have signed a petition circulated 
on the floor of the Exchange, for dissolution, and it is now expected that this will take place 
voluntarily within the next few days. There are 108 signatures to the petition, a clear majority of 
the members in good standing. 
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“Consolidated Aims at State Control,” New York Times, March 24, 1926. 
 
Complete details of a plan for reorganization of the Consolidated Stock Exchange … were made 




“Consolidated Tries New Trading Rules,” New York Times, March 31, 1926. 
 
… No Figures were available as to the volume of trading. Several members reported that very 
little trading was done, because it was virtually impossible to for a floor trader to transact 
business under the drastic stipulations. 
 
 
“Consolidated Stock Exchange Home Sold, $10,000,000 Skyscraper to Displace It,” New York 
Times, June 23, 1926. 
 
A.E. Lefcourt has purchased the property of the Consolidated Stock Exchange at Broad and 
Beaver Streets for $1,400,000 …President Phillip Evans of the Consolidated is understood to be 
planning to take quarters for that institution in the new building. 
 
 
“Denies Exchange is Out of Business,” New York Times, September 1, 1926. 
 
The statement by Special Deputy Attorney General Keyes Winter, in charge of the State Bureau 
for the Prevention of Fraud, that Attorney General Albert Ottinger has “put out of business that 
notorious gambling shop, the Consolidated Stock Exchange,” was challenged by Phillip Evans, 
President of the exchange, who denied that it was out of business, and cited and cited the fact that 
new quarters had been engaged at 14-16 Pearl Street. 
 
 
"Want Tickers out of Consolidated," New York Times, September 26, 1926. 
 
The Consolidated Stock Exchange, sadly weakened in strength as the result of action by the State 
Attorney General, is now in danger of losing its stock tickers, it was learned yesterday. .. The 
latest blow was in the form of a message from the New York Stock Exchange to the Western 
Union Telegraph Company announcing it no longer approved of the sending of Stock Exchange 
quotations on the ticker to the Consolidated. 
 
 
“Trading Resumed by Consolidated,” New York Times, February 3, 1927. 
 
After several months of inactivity the Consolidated Stock Exchange has resumed business on a 
limited scale. Four or Five floor traders and as many commission houses are doing business. The 
volume of transactions, while small, is slowly increasing, it was said at the Exchange’s executive 
offices. The three tickers which the New York Stock Exchange and Western Union Telegraph 
Company are seeking by judicial proceedings to have removed from the headquarters of the 
Consolidated at 14-16 Pearl Street are being used. 
 
 
  39"Consolidated Finds It Gave up Tickers," New York Times, February 25, 1927. 
 
Philip Evans has resigned as President of the Consolidated Stock Exchange after a stormy 
administration following the discovery that this institution, through a strange error, had been 
operating thirty-five years on the mistaken assumption that it was protected by a court decree in 
the use of its most essential facilities - the tickers of the New York Stock Exchange. The 
Consolidated learned, while engaged in defending a suit brought by the New York Stock 
Exchange to compel the Western Union Telegraph Company to remove the tickers, that a 
permanent injunction obtained in 1887, which has been the basis of its resistance in the present 
litigation, was vacated in 1891 by an agreement between the attorneys for the Consolidated and the 
New York Stock Exchange... The immediate effect is to deal a severe blow to the Consolidated's 
case, probably to force the dissolution of the Exchange and to write the final chapter in a series of 
law suits between the "big" and "little" exchanges extending over a period of forty years. 
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Figure 1: Absolute Bid-Ask Spreads on the NYSE and Regional Exchanges around the 
Initiation of Consolidated Trading (January 11, 1883 - April 9, 1886) 
  
 
This figure reports the reported absolute bid-ask spreads for all securities on the New York Stock 
Exchange and the universe of stocks trading on a selected set of the leading regional exchanges 
(Baltimore, Boston, and Philadelphia) for the period from 1875 to 1884. Absolute bid-ask spread 































































































































































































































































  41Table 1. NYSE Trading Volume: 1875 to 1884.  
 
This table reports data on trading volume (shares of common stock) on the New York Stock 
Exchange for the period from 1875 to 1884. Data are taken from the New York Times. 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Year   Annual  Total   Daily  Average    # Trading Days 
 
1875   52,784,010       173,632    304 
 
1876   39,893,720       131,229    304 
 
1877   49,423,658       162,045    305 
 
1878   39,863,540       131,130    304 
 
1879   73,545,245       241,925    304 
 
1880   94,825,866       309,888    306 
 
1881   112,549,315       371,450    303 
   
1882   112,860,374       373,710    302 
 
1883   95,482,244       316,166    302 
 
1884   95,391,386       312,759    305 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
  42Table 2. NYSE Bid-Ask Spreads: 1875 to 1884.  
 
This table reports data on bid-ask spreads on the New York Stock Exchange for 1875 to 1884. One day from each year is sampled. See the Data Appendix for the 
specific dates. Spread is the median closing bid-ask spread for a given date. Relative is the closing bid-ask spread in percentage terms [(ask-bid)/((ask+bid)/2)]. 
Most heavily traded stock is the firm with the greatest number of shares traded on a given date. Data are from the New York Times. 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
    All firms with quotes      Firms with quotes and volume     
 
Year   #  obs Spread Relative  #  obs Spread   Relative    Most heavily traded stock Spread 
 
1875   26  0.25  0.40%    26  0.25   0.40%    Western  Union    0.125 
 
1876   32  0.25  0.47%    26  0.1875   0.39%    Lake  Shore    0.125 
 
1877   32  0.50  0.94%    20  0.25   0.72%    Lake  Shore    0.125 
 
1878   37  0.50  1.03%    20  0.25   0.64%    Lake  Shore    0.125 
 
1879   37  0.50  0.64%    28  0.25   0.59%    Delaware  Lackawanna   0.125 
 
1880   80  0.50  0.66%    64  0.4375   0.66%    New  York  Lake  Erie   0.125 
 
1881   85  0.25  0.75%    73  0.25   0.51%    Ontario  and  Western   0.125 
 
1882   102  0.75  1.39%    60  0.25   0.72%    Wabash  preferred   0.125 
 
1883   100  0.50  1.20%    64  0.25   0.48%    Union  Pacific    0.125 
 
1884   112  0.75  2.33%    66  0.25   0.77%    Western  Union    0.125 
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________           __ 
  43Table 3. NYSE and Consolidated Trading Volume, 1885 to 1926. 
 
Year   NYSE Volume Consolidated  Volume  NYSE + Consolidated Consolidated/NYSE 
1885    82,396,922    7,179,424    89,576,346    8.71% 
1886 100,152,905  19,933,994  120,086,899  19.90% 
1887    83,412,220  33,322,181  116,734,401  39.95% 
1888    62,864,152  28,589,377    91,453,529  45.48% 
1889    61,939,633  27,907,618    89,847,251  45.06% 
1890    58,221,462  29,514,779    87,736,241  50.69% 
1891    64,422,981  27,398,721    91,821,702  42.53% 
1892    80,424,189  33,309,819  113,734,007  41.42% 
1893    68,203,618  27,667,558    95,871,176  40.57% 
1894    33,052,099  20,123,341    53,175,440  60.88% 
1895    51,897,895  17,790,338    69,688,233  34.28% 
1896    41,655,649  15,224,526    56,880,175  36.55% 
1897    63,636,575  18,588,519    82,225,094  29.21% 
1898    86,188,403  21,593,599  107,782,002  25.05% 
1899 120,731,589  34,287,305  155,018,894  28.40% 
1900 102,194,172  32,339,253  134,533,425  31.64% 
1901 221,808,064  50,560,361  272,368,425  22.79% 
1902 162,930,210  38,186,239  201,116,448  23.44% 
1903 137,717,237  37,886,155  175,603,392  27.51% 
1904 157,582,668  44,305,509  201,888,177  28.12% 
1905 211,502,002  46,967,181  258,469,183  22.21% 
1906 221,739,160  42,579,119  264,318,278  19.20% 
1907 156,874,644  44,557,893  201,432,537  28.40% 
1908 165,221,723  39,274,667  204,496,390  23.77% 
1909 197,818,514  30,056,626  227,875,139  15.19% 
1910 161,436,368  27,609,700  189,046,068  17.10% 
1911 125,006,647  18,892,837  143,899,484  15.11% 
1912 132,689,097  14,712,271  147,401,368  11.09% 
1913    82,949,155  12,172,827    95,121,982  14.68% 
1914*    47,421,197  5,970,339    53,391,536  12.59% 
1915  172,496,804  12,353,951  184,850,755    7.16% 
1916  232,633,124  20,018,974  252,652,098    8.61% 
1917 184,767,325  20,306,104  205,073,428  10.99% 
1918  142,392,667  11,298,003  153,690,671    7.93% 
1919  315,181,380  28,669,666  343,851,046    9.10% 
1920 228,049,127  27,267,772  255,316,899  11.96% 
1921 172,922,936  44,728,185  217,651,121  25.87% 
1922 260,276,700  48,665,596  308,942,296  18.70% 
1923 236,132,478  26,790,253  262,922,731  11.35% 
1924  283,592,481  21,088,295  304,680,776    7.44% 
1925  463,924,822  20,003,142  483,927,964    4.31% 
1926**    61,636,700       783,494    62,420,194    1.27% 
        
mean 145,192,802  26,916,083  172,108,886  23.48% 
median 135,203,167  27,504,210  154,354,782  22.50% 
maximum 463,924,822  50,560,361  483,927,964  60.88% 
minimum     33,052,099       783,494    53,175,440     1.27% 
 
* markets closed from August until mid-December  ** January and February only 
Source: NYSE and New York Times 
  44Table 4. Comparison of the Number of Stocks Traded on the NYSE and Consolidated: 1885 to 1926 
 
This table reports the number of NYSE-listed stocks traded on the NYSE and the Consolidated Exchange for 1885 to 1926. One day 
from each year is sampled. See the Data Appendix for specific dates and data sources. All NYSE is the number of NYSE listings on a 
given date with reported bid-ask quotes. NYSE with Volume is the number of NYSE listings on a given date with quotes and positive 
trading volume on the NYSE. Consolidated with Volume is the number of NYSE listings with volume on the Consolidated Exchange. 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 All  NYSE  with  Consolidated   Consolidated  as  percent  of 
Year NYSE Volume   With Volume   All  NYSE  NYSE with Volume 
 
1885  114  55   18    16%   33% 
1886  117  72   24    21%   33% 
1887  98  72   33    34%   46% 
1888  127  78   39    31%   50% 
1889  130  96   41    32%   43% 
1890  160  80   30    19%   38% 
1891  140  59   21    15%   36% 
1892  146  99   55    38%   56% 
1893  145  82   39    27%   48% 
1894  149  78   25    17%   32% 
1895  144  79   24    17%   30% 
1896  167  90   29    17%   32% 
1897  168  77   20    12%   26% 
1898  195  136   34    17%   27% 
1899  209  155   38    18%   25% 
1900  221  151   40    18%   26% 
1901  229  158   44    19%   28% 
1902  223  134   37    17%   28% 
1903  254  121   49    19%   40% 
1904  255  128   53    21%   41% 
1905  255  176   48    19%   27% 
1906  265  161   49    18%   30% 
1907  277  151   35    13%   23% 
1908  269  111   35    13%   32% 
1909  263  149   61    23%   41% 
1910  270  139   53    20%   38% 
1911  280  153   51    18%   33% 
1912  289  155   50    17%   32% 
1913  333  147   44    13%   30% 
1914  311  160   51    16%   32% 
1915  254  138   51    20%   37% 
1916  347  214   76    22%   36% 
1917  399  227   63    16%   28% 
1918  397  220   73    18%   33% 
1919  412  189   65    16%   34% 
1920  488  247   88    18%   36% 
1921  548  273   145    26%   53% 
1922  584  329   198    34%   60% 
1923  669  406   201    30%   50% 
1924  741  441   208    28%   47% 
1925  773  507   276    36%   54% 
1926  863  565   127    15%   22% 
 
     M e d i a n    1 8 %    3 3 %  
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
  45Table 5. NYSE Bid-Ask Spreads: 1885 to 1926. 
 
This table reports median bid-ask spreads for the NYSE for the 1885 to 1926 period. One day from each year is sampled. See the Data 
Appendix for specific dates and sources. All NYSE with Quotes is the spread for all NYSE listings with quotes on a given date. 
Volume, not Consolidated is the spread for NYSE listings with volume on the NYSE but not on the Consolidated Exchange. Volume, 
also Consolidated is the spread for NYSE listings with volume on both the NYSE and the Consolidated Exchange. 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
  All NYSE with Quotes    Volume, not Consolidated   Volume, also Consolidate 
Year #  obs Spread Relative   # obs Spread Relative   # obs Spread Relative 
 
1885  114  1.00 3.93%    37  0.75 2.93%    18  0.125  0.30% 
1886  117  0.75 2.17%    48  0.50 1.39%    24  0.125  0.46% 
1887  98 0.75  1.43%    39 0.75  1.40%    33 0.25  0.46%   
1888  127  0.875  1.90%   39  0.75  1.76%   39  0.375  1.09% 
1889  130  0.625  1.58%   55  0.75  1.85%   41  0.25  0.51% 
1890  160  1.00 2.67%    50  1.00 2.57%    30  0.25 0.61% 
1891  140  1.00 2.63%    38  0.75 1.73%    21  0.25 0.60% 
1892  146  0.75  1.60%   44  0.813  1.60%   55  0.375  0.65% 
1893  145  1.50 4.44%    43  1.00 3.05%    39  0.375  0.89% 
1894  149  1.00 3.60%    53  0.50 2.14%    25  0.25 0.72% 
1895  144  0.938  3.26%   55  0.50  2.30%   24  0.25  0.65% 
1896  167  1.00  3.21%   61  0.625  2.11%   29  0.25  0.48% 
1897  168  1.00 3.64%    57  0.50 1.94%    20  0.25 0.46% 
1898  195  0.50 2.30%    92  0.50 1.60%    34  0.188  0.41% 
1899  209  0.50 1.35%    117  0.50 1.31%    38  0.25 0.39% 
1900  221  0.75 1.68%    111  0.50 1.38%    40  0.25 0.46% 
1901  229 0.50  1.26%    114 0.50  0.93%    44  0.125  0.34% 
1902  223  0.75 1.28%    97  0.50 0.80%    37  0.125  0.32% 
1903  254  1.00 1.75%    72  0.50 1.18%    49  .025 0.35% 
1904  255  1.00 2.74%    75  0.75 1.63%    53  0.25 0.56% 
1905  255 0.75  1.46%    128 0.50  1.26%    48  0.125  0.29% 
1906  265 0.75  1.32%    112 0.50  0.73%    49  0.125  0.28% 
1907  277 1.00  2.22%    116 0.75  1.38%    35  0.125  0.32% 
1908  269  1.50 4.38%    76  1.00 2.16%    35  0.125  0.50% 
1909  263  0.875  1.80%   88  0.50  1.18%   61  0.25  0.51% 
1910  270  1.00 2.28%    86  0.75 1.16%    53  0.375  0.72% 
1911  280  0.75 1.53%    102  0.50 0.71%    51  0.25 0.41% 
1912  289  1.00 2.14%    105  1.00 1.60%    50  0.25 0.47% 
1913  333  1.25 2.41%    103  0.75 1.26%    44  0.25 0.44% 
1914  311  1.00 2.00%    109  0.75 0.92%    51  0.25 0.47% 
1915  254  1.00 2.69%    87  1.00 2.15%    51  0.375  0.90% 
1916  347  1.00 1.87%    138  0.75 1.57%    76  0.25 0.62% 
1917  399  1.00 1.94%    164  1.00 1.63%    63  0.25 0.55% 
1918  397 1.125  2.96%    147 0.75  2.02%    73  0.25  0.57% 
1919  412 1.00  2.67%    124 0.75  1.47%    65  0.375  0.77% 
1920  488 1.00  2.02%    159 0.75  1.33%    88  0.375  0.67% 
1921  548 1.00  3.17%    128 0.875  1.24%    145 0.375  1.24% 
1922  584 0.875  2.73%    131 0.875  2.37%    198 0.375  1.11% 
1923  669 0.75  1.89%    205 0.75  1.60%    201 0.375  0.90% 
1924  741 0.50  1.77%    233 0.50  1.68%    208 0.25  0.87% 
1925  773 0.625  1.41%    231 0.625  1.18%    276 0.25  0.78% 
1926  863 0.50  1.23%    438 0.50  0.96%    127 0.25  0.60% 
 
Median   1.00  2.08%    0.75  1.60%    0.25  0.53% 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
      
  46Table 6. Most Heavily Traded Stock: 1885 to 1926. 
 
This table reports the most heavily traded stock on the NYSE and the Consolidated Exchange in the 1885 to 1926 period. One day 
from each year is sampled. See the Data Appendix for specific dates. For the most heavily traded stock on a given exchange, the table 
also reports the rank in volume on the rival exchange and the bid-ask spread of the stock on the NYSE. 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
     N Y S E        N Y S E  
Year NYSE    Rank on Consol Spread   Consolidated Rank  on  NYSE Spread 
 
1885  Delaware Lackawanna  9  0.125    Chicago Milwaukee  8  0.125 
1886  Delaware Lackawanna  3  0.125    Chicago Milwaukee  2  0.125 
1887  Philadelphia & Reading  3  0.125    Lake Shore    6  0.25 
1888  Chicago Milwaukee  2  0.125    Philadelphia & Reading  2  0.25 
1889  Delaware Lackawanna  1  0.25    Delaware Lackawanna  1  0.25 
1890  American  Sugar   1  0.125   American  Sugar   1  0.125 
1891  Chicago Rock Island  1  0.25    Chicago Rock Island  1  0.25 
1892  Philadelphia & Reading  2  0.125    NY & New England  7  0.125 
1893  Louisville & Nashville  16  0.25    Chicago Milwaukee  2  0.125 
1894  American  Sugar   1  0.125   American  Sugar   1  0.125 
1895  Chicago  Gas   2  0.125   Chicago  Milwaukee  2  0.125 
1896  Philadelphia & Reading  2  0.125    American Sugar    2  0.25 
1897  Northern Pacific pref  7  0.125    American Sugar    2  0.125 
1898  Chesapeake & Ohio  23  0.125    American Sugar    11  0.125 
1899  American  Sugar   1  0.125   American  Sugar   1  0.125 
1900  American  Sugar   1  0.25   American  Sugar   1  0.25 
1901  Southern  Pacific   1  0.125   Southern  Pacific   1  0.125 
1902  Southern  Pacific   4  0.125   Amalgamated  Copper  2  0.25 
1903  Erie    1  0.125   Erie    1  0.125 
1904  Pennsylvania   3  0.125   US  Steel  pref   2  0.25 
1905  Union  Pacific   3  0.125   US  Steel  pref   6  0.125 
1906  Amalgamated Copper  1  0.125    Amalgamated Copper  1  0.125 
1907  Reading    1  0.125   Reading    1  0.125 
1908  Reading    1  0.125   Reading    1  0.125 
1909  Reading    2  0.125   Union  Pacific   3  0.125 
1910  Reading    3  0.125   US  Steel    2  0.125 
1911  US  Steel    1  0.125   US  Steel    1  0.125 
1912  US  Steel    1  0.125   US  Steel    1  0.125 
1913  American  Can   3  0.125   Reading    3  0.125 
1914  US  Steel    1  0.125   US  Steel    1  0.125 
1915  Reading    1  0.125   Reading    1  0.125 
1916  US  Steel    1  0.125   US  Steel    1  0.125 
1917  US  Steel    1  0.125   US  Steel    1  0.125 
1918  US  Steel    1  0.125   US  Steel    1  0.125 
1919  US  Steel    1  0.125   US  Steel    1  0.125 
1920  Baldwin Locomotive  1  0.125    Baldwin Locomotive  1  0.125 
1921  General  Asphalt   2  0.125   Mexican  Petroleum  3  0.50 
1922  Studebaker Corp   2  0.125    Island Oil & Transport  17  0.25 
1923  US  Steel    4  0.125   California  Petroleum  5  0.125 
1924  General  Motors   5  0.125   Studebaker  Corp   3  0.125 
1925  Independent Oil & Gas  37  0.25    Radio Corp of America  9  0.125 
1926  Sinclair  Oil   1  0.125   Sinclair  Oil   1  0.125 
 
  Median   1.5  0.125      1.5  0.125 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
  47Table 7. Summary Statistics of Pre- and Consolidated Period (December 28, 1883 - April 9, 1886) 
 
This table reports the sample statistics for the trading data from the NYSE in the 120 weeks surrounding the initiation of trading of 
NYSE listed securities on the Consolidated Stock Exchange. One day, usually Friday, from each week is sampled. Absolute bid-ask 
spread is the closing bid-ask spread for a given day. The relative bid-ask spread is the closing bid-ask spread in percentage terms 
[(ask-bid)/((ask+bid)/2)]. The individual security volume is the total NYSE volume for the security for a given day. The individual 
security closing price is the NYSE closing price for that day. Individual security volatility is the standard deviation of a given 
security’s return over the entire sample period. The NYSE total weekly volume is the total volume for all securities for a given day and 
the previous five days of trading. A security’s share of total volume is that security’s total NYSE volume for a given day divided by 
the total NYSE volume for that day. The concentration ratio is the sum of the volume for the four securities with the highest volume 
on a given day divided by the total NYSE volume for that day. The broker’s call rate is the closing weekly call rate for the week for 
which other data are taken. The presence of Consolidated trading takes a value of one for all observations in the 60 weeks after 
February 17, 1885 and is zero for the observations in the 60 weeks before Feb 17, 1885. There are 7,036 observations for all variables. 
             
 
    Standard    
Variable Mean Median Deviation Minimum Maximum 
       
    Full Sample (n = 7,036)         
absolute bid-ask spread         0.685         0.375      0.936      0.125       20.000 
relative bid-ask spread (%)         2.776         1.067      5.004      0.090     133.333 
individual security volume         5,251            600    13,032             5     171,516 
individual security closing price       52.893       41.375    40.133      0.250     150.000 
individual security volatility (%)         7.099         6.303      4.759      1.282       24.887 
NYSE total weekly volume  1,990,360  1,919,794  715,420  714,709  4,500,137 
security's share of total volume (%)         1.689         0.192      4.064      0.001       45.729 
concentration ratio (%)       55.516       56.507      9.821    32.723       80.660 
broker's call rate (%)         2.040         2.000      1.086      1.000         9.500 
Presence of Consolidated trading (%)      53.681      100.000    49.867      0.000     100.000 
       
    Pre-Consolidated Period (n = 3,259)       
absolute bid-ask spread         0.758         0.375      1.063      0.125        20.000 
relative bid-ask spread (%)         3.040         1.130      5.246      0.095      133.333 
individual security volume         5,790            550    14,671             5      171,516 
individual security closing price       52.876       42.500    39.872      1.000      148.500 
individual security volatility (%)         7.023         6.126      4.829      1.282       24.887 
NYSE total weekly volume   1,899,926  1,876,306  556,089  869,380  3,404,115 
security's share of total volume (%)         1.815         0.183      4.449      0.001       44.899 
concentration ratio (%)       59.483       58.949      7.655    43.066       80.660 
broker's call rate (%)         2.098           1.750      1.305      1.000         9.500 
       
    Consolidated Period (n = 3,777)     
absolute bid-ask spread         0.622         0.375      0.806      0.125       10.000 
relative bid-ask spread (%)         2.548         1.036      4.775      0.090     100.000 
individual security volume         4,786            600    11,411             5     114,230 
individual security closing price       52.907       40.125    40.362      0.250     150.000 
individual security volatility (%)         7.165         6.383      4.689      1.282       24.887 
NYSE total weekly volume  2,068,391  1,932,515  820,739  714,709  4,500,137 
security's share of total volume (%)         1.579         0.204      3.697      0.001       45.729 
concentration ratio (%)       52.093       53.551    10.189    32.723       72.868 
broker's call rate (%)         1.990         2.000      0.851      1.000         5.500 
 
             
  48Table 8. Summary Statistics of Pre- and Consolidated Period for Companies with and without 
Consolidated Volume  (December 28, 1883 - April 9, 1886) 
 
This table reports the sample statistics for the trading data from the NYSE in the 120 weeks surrounding the initiation of trading of 
NYSE listed securities on the Consolidated Stock Exchange. One day, usually Friday, from each week is sampled. Absolute bid-ask 
spread is the closing bid-ask spread for a given day. Individual Security Volume (both exchanges) is the sum of the NYSE and 
Consolidated volume for the day. All other variables are defined as in Table 7. 
             
 
         Standard    
Variable   Mean     Median    Deviation     Minimum Maximum 
 
Full Period,  Firms without Consolidated Trading (n = 2,213) 
absolute bid-ask spread    1.292    1.000    1.329  0.125    20.000 
relative bid-ask spread (%)      0.039    0.020    0.060  0.001      1.333 
individual security volume (NYSE)       436       200       843         5    12,710 
individual security closing price  63.626  52.000  44.810  1.000  150.000 
individual security volatility (%)    0.066    0.064    0.046  0.013      0.164 
 
 Full Period,  Firms with Consolidated Trading (n = 4,823) 
absolute bid-ask spread     0.407    0.250    0.473  0.125      7.000 
relative bid-ask spread (%)    0.023    0.008    0.044  0.001      1.000 
individual security volume (NYSE)    7,460    1,200  15,229         5  171,516 
individual security closing price  47.969  38.875  36.765  0.250  139.375 
individual security volatility (%)    0.073    0.061    0.048  0.017      0.249 
 
          Pre-Consolidated Period, Firms without Consolidated Trading (n = 976) 
absolute bid-ask spread    1.505    1.000    1.526  0.125    20.000 
relative bid-ask spread (%)    0.046    0.023    0.074  0.001      1.333 
individual security volume (NYSE)       382       200       723         5    12,710 
individual security closing price  66.101  62.000  44.476  1.000  148.500 
individual security volatility (%)    0.063    0.040    0.047  0.013      0.164 
 
          Pre-Consolidated Period, Firms with Consolidated Trading (n = 2,283) 
absolute bid-ask spread    0.439    0.250    0.528  0.125      6.500 
relative bid-ask spread (%)    0.024    0.008    0.038  0.001      0.435 
individual security volume (NYSE)    8,102     1200  17,006         5  171,516 
individual security closing price  47.223  38.500  36.301  1.125  131.500 
individual security volatility (%)    0.073    0.061    0.049  0.017      0.249 
 
Consolidated Period, Firms without Consolidated Trading (n = 1,237) 
absolute bid-ask spread    1.124    0.875    1.122  0.125    10.000 
relative bid-ask spread (%)    0.033    0.018    0.046  0.001     0.560 
individual security volume (NYSE)       478       200       926         5    10,610 
individual security closing price  61.673  47.375  44.994  1.250  150.000 
individual security volatility (%)    0.069    0.065    0.045  0.013      0.164 
 
Consolidated Period, Firms with Consolidated Trading (n = 2,540) 
absolute bid-ask spread    0.378    0.250    0.415  0.125      7.000 
relative bid-ask spread (%)    0.022    0.007    0.048  0.001      1.000 
individual security volume (NYSE)    6,883     1200  13,409         5  114,230 
individual security closing price  48.638  39.000  37.171  0.250  139.375 
individual security volatility (%)    0.073    0.063    0.048  0.017      0.249 
individual security volume (both exchanges)    7,764    1,288  15,724         5  158,790 
             
 
  49Table 9. The Effect of Consolidated Trading on the NYSE in the Pre- and Consolidated Period 
(December 28, 1883 - April 9, 1886) 
 
This table reports the results from the estimation of the following model:  
SPREADit = α+ β1VOLit + β2CLOSEit+ β3STDEVi + β4COMPt + εit 
 
where SPREAD is either the natural log of the absolute or the relative spread as defined in Table 7. COMP is a dummy variable that 
takes on a value of one for all observations in the 60 weeks after February 17, 1885 and the value of zero for the observations in the 60 
weeks before Feb 17, 1885. The other variables are as defined as in Table 7 and are measured in natural logs. Robust standard errors 
are in parentheses. *** significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 1%. 
             
 
                  (A)                  (B)            (C)            (D) 
                         dependent variable 
  natural log of  natural log of    natural log of     natural log of 
 absolute  spread absolute  spread    relative spread     relative spread 
       
natural log of   -0.33586*  -0.12926*  -0.33594*  -0.13263* 
individual security volume    (0.004)    (0.006)    (0.004)    (0.006) 
       
natural log of   0.37037*  -0.18592*  -0.61892*  -1.14973* 
individual security closing price    (0.018)    (0.028)    (0.018)    (0.030) 
       
natural log of   0.30886*    0.31914*   
individual security volatility    (0.027)      (0.027)   
       
presence of Consolidated trading  -0.12286*  -0.15396*  -0.11957*  -0.15141* 
    (0.017)    (0.014)    (0.017)    (0.014) 
       
constant  0.94278* 0.69467* 0.93105*  0.58464* 
    (0.048)    (0.100)    (0.048)    (0.102) 
       
company fixed effects included       no       yes       no       yes 
       
Observations      7036      7036      7036      7036 
R-squared     0.484     0.662     0.730     0.821 
 
             
  50Table 9A. Bid-Ask Spreads on the Boston Exchange in the Pre- and Consolidated Period 
(December 28, 1883 - April 9, 1886) 
 
This table reports the results from the estimation of the following model:  
SPREADit = α+ β1VOLit + β2CLOSEit+ β3STDEVi + β4COMPt + εit 
 
where SPREAD is either the natural log of the absolute or the relative spread as defined in Table 7. COMP is a dummy variable that 
takes on a value of one for all observations in the 60 weeks after February 17, 1885 and the value of zero for the observations in the 60 
weeks before Feb 17, 1885. The other variables are as defined as in Table 7 and are measured in natural logs. Robust standard errors 
are in parentheses. *** significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 1%. 
             
 
                  (A)                  (B)            (C)            (D) 
  natural log of  natural log of    natural log of     natural log of 
 absolute  spread absolute  spread    relative spread     relative spread 
 
natural log of   -0.15331*  -0.06678*  -0.15295*  -0.06833* 
individual security volume     (0.009)     (0.012)     (0.009)     (0.012) 
      
natural log of   0.25599*  -0.14621**  -0.73991*  -1.11075* 
individual security closing price     (0.018)     (0.072)     (0.018)     (0.074) 
      
natural log of   0.18668*    0.18710*   
individual security volatility     (0.032)       (0.032)   
      
presence of Consolidated trading  0.02561  -0.04206  0.02616  -0.04542 
     (0.036)     (0.032)     (0.036)     (0.032) 
      
constant -0.87186*  -0.26897  -0.88955*  -0.39137 
     (0.086)     (0.248)     (0.085)     (0.256) 
      
company fixed effects included      no       yes       no       yes 
      
Observations     1490     1490     1490     1490 
R-squared     0.321     0.555     0.676    0.788 
 
             
  51Table 10. The Effect of Consolidated Trading on the NYSE with Additional Control Variables 
in the Pre- and Consolidated Period (December 28, 1883 - April 9, 1886)  
 
This table reports the results from the estimation of the following model:  
SPREADit = α0+ β1VOLit + β2CLOSEit+ β3STDEVi + β4COMPt + β5WVOLit + β6CALLt+ β7SHAREit + β8CONCt + εit 
 
where SPREAD is either the natural log of the absolute or the relative spread as defined in Table 7. COMP is a dummy variable that 
takes on a value of one for all observations in the 60 weeks after February 17, 1885 and the value of zero for the observations in the 60 
weeks before Feb 17, 1885. The other variables are as defined as in Table 7 but measured in natural logs. Robust standard errors are in 
parentheses. *** significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 1%. 
             
 
          (A)           (B)                   (C)         (D) 
                                          dependent variable 
  natural log of  natural log of  natural log of  natural log of 
  absolute spread  absolute spread  relative spread  relative spread 
        
natural log of   -0.03040  -0.01599  -0.03273  -0.01756 
individual security volume    (0.037)    (0.030)    (0.037)    (0.030) 
        
natural log of   0.34837*  -0.22584*  -0.64069*  -1.18756* 
individual security closing price   (0.018)   (0.031)   (0.018)   (0.032) 
        
natural log of   0.26885*    0.27951*   
individual security volatility    (0.028)      (0.027)   
        
presence of Consolidated trading  -0.13701*  -0.14301*  -0.13426*  -0.14095* 
    (0.019)    (0.015)    (0.019)    (0.015) 
        
natural log of   -0.13450*  -0.05527  -0.13276*  -0.05847*** 
NYSE total weekly volume    (0.042)    (0.034)    (0.042)    (0.034) 
        
natural log of   0.078839*  0.10096*  0.07516*  0.09574* 
broker's call rate    (0.025)    (0.020)    (0.025)    (0.021) 
        
natural log of   -0.31150*  -0.12448*  -0.30922*  -0.12604* 
security's share of total volume    (0.037)    (0.030)    (0.037)    (0.030) 
        
natural log of   -0.24564*  -0.02298  -0.24746*  -0.02571 
concentration ratio    (0.055)    (0.045)    (0.055)    (0.046) 
        
constant -0.87057**  0.52022  -0.89392**  0.40550 
    (0.452)    (0.361)    (0.450)    (0.365) 
        
company fixed effects included       no       yes       no       yes 
       
Observations     7036     7036     7036     7036 
R-squared    0.497    0.665    0.737    0.823 
 
             
  52Table 10A. Bid-Ask Spreads on the Boston Exchange in the Pre- and Consolidated Period with 
Additional Control Variables  (December 28, 1883 - April 9, 1886)  
 
This table reports the results from the estimation of the following model:  
SPREADit = α0+ β1VOLit + β2CLOSEit+ β3STDEVi + β4COMPt + β5WVOLit + β6CALLt+ β7SHAREit + β8CONCt + εit 
 
where SPREAD is either the natural log of the absolute or the relative spread as defined in Table 7. COMP is a dummy variable that 
takes on a value of one for all observations in the 60 weeks after February 17, 1885 and the value of zero for the observations in the 60 
weeks before Feb 17, 1885. The other variables are as defined as in Table 7 but measured in natural logs. Robust standard errors are in 
parentheses. *** significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 1%. 
             
 
          (A)           (B)                   (C)         (D) 
                                          dependent variable 
  natural log of  natural log of  natural log of  natural log of 
  absolute spread  absolute spread  relative spread  relative spread 
 
natural log of   -0.08044*  -0.06019*  -0.08121*  -0.06386* 
individual security volume    (0.027)    (0.023)    (0.027)    (0.023) 
      
natural log of   0.24642*  -0.19220*  -0.74943*  -1.15548* 
individual security closing price    (0.018)    (0.071)    (0.018)    (0.074) 
      
natural log of   0.17002*    0.17055*   
individual security volatility    (0.032)      (0.032)   
      
presence of Consolidated trading  -0.05717  -0.05778  -0.05559  -0.05925 
    (0.043)    (0.036)    (0.043)    (0.036) 
      
natural log of   0.15802*  0.12918*  0.16034*  0.13063* 
broker's call rate    (0.054)    (0.045)    (0.054)    (0.045) 
      
natural log of   -0.08298*  -0.01223  -0.08179*  -0.00981 
security's share of total volume    (0.028)    (0.024)    (0.028)    (0.024) 
      
natural log of   0.04528  0.10317  0.04598  0.10415 
concentration ratio    (0.078)    (0.066)    (0.078)    (0.066) 
      
constant -1.59436*  -0.19482  -1.60330*  -0.30323 
    (0.249)    (0.295)    (0.248)    (0.300) 
      
company fixed effects included      no      yes      no      yes 
      
Observations    1490    1490    1490    1490 
R-squared    0.337    0.561    0.684    0.79 
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(September 1886 – February 1926) 
 
This table reports the sample statistics for the trading data for the firms in the Dow Jones Industrial Average beginning in September 
1886, and the Dow Jones Railroad Index beginning in October 1896.  One day, usually the last day of the month, from each month is 
sampled. Absolute bid-ask spread is the closing bid-ask spread for a given day. The relative bid-ask spread is the closing bid-ask 
spread in percentage terms [(ask-bid)/((ask+bid)/2)]. The individual security volume is the total NYSE volume for the security for a 
given day. The individual security closing price is the NYSE closing price for that day. Individual security volatility is the standard 
deviation of a given security’s return over the entire sample period. NYSE total monthly volume is the total volume for all securities for 
a given month. A security’s share of total volume is that security’s total NYSE volume for a given day divided by the total NYSE 
volume for that day. The concentration ratio is the sum of the volume for the four securities with the highest volume on a given day 
divided by the total NYSE volume for that day. The broker’s call rate is the closing monthly call rate for the month for which other 
data is taken. The Consolidated share of total volume is the total volume for security i on the Consolidated divided by the total volume 
on the Consolidated for security i plus the total volume on security i on the NYSE for a given day. The presence of Consolidated 
volume takes on a value of one for all observations where the Consolidated had trading volume and 0 otherwise. There are 12,389 
observations for each variable. 
             
 
    Standard     
Variable          Mean        Median Deviation Minimum Maximum 
         
absolute bid-ask spread           0.414           0.250         0.453         0.125         10.500 
relative bid-ask spread (%)           0.627           0.378         0.846         0.051         18.182 
individual security volume         10,626           2,700       26,069                4       489,444 
individual security closing price         88.239         87.000       45.867         1.250       400.000 
individual security volatility (%)         11.348           7.314       13.053         2.634         76.841 
NYSE total monthly volume  14,700,000  12,898,720  9,304,893  1,667,854  79,600,000 
security's share of total volume (%)           3.742           1.071         7.070         0.001         79.004 
concentration ratio (%)         63.010         63.017       13.348       29.036         94.550 
broker's call rate (%)           4.023           3.500         3.499         0.875         40.000 
consolidated share of total volume  (%)         11.210           6.593       13.682         0.000         99.514 
presence of Consolidated volume (%)         74.816       100.000       43.409         0.000       100.000 
 
             
 
  54Table 12. Long-Term Effects of Consolidated Trading on the NYSE (Sept. 1886 – Feb. 1926)  
 
This table reports the results from the estimation of the following model:  
SPREADit = α+ β1VOLit + β2CLOSEit+ β3STDEVi + β4COMPt  + εit 
 
where SPREAD is either the natural log of the absolute or the relative spread as defined in Table 10. We measure competition, COMP, in two different ways. The natural log of Consolidated share is the total 
volume for security i on the Consolidated divided by the total volume on the Consolidated for security i plus the total volume on security i on the NYSE for a given day. The Consolidated presence takes on a value 
of one for all observations where the Consolidated had trading volume and 0 otherwise. The other variables are as defined as in Table 10 but measured in natural logs. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** 
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 1%. 
                     
     (A)         (B)            (C)  (D)     (E)         (F)             (G)  (H)      (I)          (J)             (K)    (L) 
                dependent variable   
  ln of  ln of  ln of  ln of  ln of  ln of  ln of  ln of  ln of  ln of  ln of  ln of 
  absolute absolute relative  relative  absolute absolute relative  relative  absolute absolute relative  relative 
  spread spread spread spread spread spread spread spread spread spread spread spread 
              
natural log of  individual  -0.21695*  -0.21903*  -0.21947*  -0.22155* -0.18295* -0.18412* -0.18636* -0.18747* -0.16065* -0.16013* -0.16495* -0.16451* 
security volume  (0.0040)  (0.0040)  (0.0040) (0.0040) (0.0043) (0.0043) (0.0043) (0.0044) (0.0044) (0.0045) (0.0046) (0.0046) 
              
natural log of  individual  0.27164*  0.26994*  -0.70855*  -0.71021* 0.21868*  0.22057*  -0.74160* -0.73978* 0.17654*  0.17266*  -0.77143* -0.77521* 
security closing price  (0.0111)  (0.0112)  (0.0117) (0.0118) (0.0147) (0.0149) (0.0171) (0.0170) (0.0163) (0.0164) (0.0212) (0.0212) 
              
natural  log  of    individual  0.05315*  0.04583*  0.06055*  0.05335*          
security volatility  (0.0095)  (0.0095)  (0.0096)  (0.0096)          
              
natural  log  of    -0.03648*   -0.03584*   -0.02959*   -0.02884*    -0.02813*   -0.02767*  
Consolidated  Share  (0.0024)   (0.0024)   (0.0025)   (0.0025)    -0.0025   -0.0025  
              
Consolidated Presence    -0.22538*    -0.22123*   -0.16667*   -0.16274*   -0.16706*   -0.16363* 
    (0.0167)   (0.0167)   (0.0173)   (0.0173)   -0.01705   -0.01707 
              
Constant  -0.69104* -0.36935* -0.73574* -0.41966* -0.83500* -0.58953* -0.97651* -0.73724* -1.26154* -1.02688* -1.44305* -1.21240* 
 (0.0499)  (0.0460)  (0.0503)  (0.0466)  (0.0633) (0.0618) (0.0702) (0.0686) (0.0972) (0.0961) (0.1072) (0.1062) 
              
company  fixed  effects  no  no  no  no  yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
year  fixed  effects  no no no no no no no no yes  yes  yes  yes 
Observations 12,389  12,389  12,389 12,389 12,389 12,389 12,389 12,389 12,389 12,389 12,389 12,389 
R-squared  0.353 0.349 0.545 0.543 0.430 0.427 0.599 0.597 0.470 0.469 0.626 0.625 
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This table reports the results from the estimation of the following model:  
SPREADit = α0+ β1VOLit+ β2CLOSEit+ β3STDEVi + β4COMPt + β5MVOLit + β6CALLt + β7SHAREit  + β8CONCt + εit 
where SPREAD is either the natural log of the absolute or the relative spread as defined in Table 10. The Consolidated share is the total volume for security i on the Consolidated divided by the total volume on the 
Consolidated for security i plus the total volume on security i on the NYSE for a given day. The Consolidated presence takes on a value of one for all observations where the Consolidated had trading volume and 0 
otherwise. The other variables are as defined as in Table 10 but measured in natural logs. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 1%. 
                     
     (A)         (B)            (C)  (D)     (E)         (F)             (G)  (H)      (I)          (J)             (K)    (L) 
                 dependent  variable 
  ln of  ln of  ln of  ln of  ln of  ln of  ln of  ln of  ln of  ln of  ln of  ln of 
  absolute absolute absolute relative  relative  relative  absolute  absolute  absolute relative relative relative 
independent variable spread spread spread spread spread spread spread spread spread spread spread spread 
               
natural log of individual  -0.17163*  -0.16730*  -0.17323*  -0.16899* -0.12102* -0.11860* -0.12460* -0.12225* -0.03750*  -0.03475* -0.03739* -0.03475* 
security volume  (0.0091)  (0.0091)  (0.0091) (0.0091) (0.0092) (0.0092) (0.0092) (0.0093) (0.0115)  (0.0115) (0.0115) (0.0116) 
               
natural log of individual  0.25740*  0.25308*  -0.72177*  -0.72598* 0.17115*  0.17011*  -0.78547* -0.78648* 0.18527*  0.18174*  -0.76230* -0.76573* 
security closing price  (0.0111)  (0.0112)  (0.0120) (0.0120) (0.0148) (0.0149) (0.0185) (0.0184) (0.0164)  (0.0165) (0.0209) (0.0209) 
               
natural  log  of  individual  0.05138*  0.04418*  0.05905*  0.05197*           
security  volatility  (0.0095)  (0.0095)  (0.0097)  (0.0097)           
               
natural log of   -0.03397*    -0.03336*    -0.02635*   -0.02578*   -0.02569*    -0.02517*  
Consolidated  Share  (0.0024)   (0.0024)   (0.0025)   (0.0025)   (0.0025)    (0.0025)  
               
Consolidated  Presence  -0.21967*   -0.21530*   -0.15151*   -0.14815*    -0.15406*   -0.15025* 
   (0.0167)   (0.0167)   (0.0172)   (0.0172)    (0.0170)   (0.0170) 
               
natural  log  of  NYSE  0.05505* 0.06073* 0.04935* 0.05489* 0.06297* 0.06682* 0.05296* 0.05673* -0.02178  -0.02082 -0.02545 -0.02452 
total monthly volume  (0.0118)  (0.0119)  (0.0119) (0.0119) (0.0124) (0.0124) (0.0127) (0.0127) (0.0168)  (0.0169) (0.0169) (0.0169) 
               
natural  log  of    0.11581* 0.11461* 0.11649* 0.11530* 0.09263* 0.09179* 0.09344* 0.09262* 0.03226** 0.03301* 0.03272* 0.03347* 
broker's call rate  (0.0098)  (0.0098)  (0.0098) (0.0098) (0.0095) (0.0095) (0.0095) (0.0095) (0.0127)  (0.0127) (0.0127) (0.0127) 
               
natural log of security's  -0.05743*  -0.06298*  -0.05838*  -0.06387* -0.07701* -0.08054* -0.07667* -0.08012* -0.14557*  -0.14809* -0.15052* -0.15301* 
share of total volume  (0.0094)  (0.0094)  (0.0094) (0.0094) (0.0097) (0.0097) (0.0097) (0.0097) (0.0122)  (0.0122) (0.0123) (0.0123) 
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natural log of   -0.10021*  -0.09361*  -0.11102*  -0.10454*  -0.07848* -0.0690** -0.09084* -0.08156* -0.17458*  -0.17638* -0.17506* -0.17681* 
concentration ratio  (0.0277)  (0.0277)  (0.0278) (0.0279) (0.0276) (0.0275) (0.0279) (0.0278) (0.0380)  (0.0380) (0.0381) (0.0381) 
               
constant  -1.79533* -1.64571* -1.76539* -1.61850* -2.20573* -2.07753* -2.20081* -2.07542* -2.42718*  -2.25285* -2.60369* -2.43335* 
  (0.1641) (0.1643) (0.1637) (0.1639) (0.1688) (0.1692) (0.1685) (0.1691) (0.2641)  (0.2650) (0.2684) (0.2694) 
               
company  fixed  effects  no  no  no  no  yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
year  fixed  effects  no no no no no no no no yes  yes  yes  yes 
Observations 12,389  12,389  12,389 12,389 12,389 12,389 12,389 12,389 12,389  12,389 12,389 12,389 
R-squared  0.374 0.372 0.560 0.559 0.448 0.446 0.611 0.610 0.479  0.478 0.633 0.632 
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This table reports the results from the estimation of the following models: 
 
SPREADit = α+ β1VOLit + β2CLOSEit+ β3STDEVi + β4COMPt  + εit 
SPREADit = α0+ β1VOLit+ β2CLOSEit+ β3STDEVi + β4COMPt + β5MVOLit + β6CALLt + β7SHAREit  + β8CONCt + εit 
where SPREAD is either the natural log of the absolute or the relative spread as defined in Table 10. The Post-Silkworth Resignation takes on a value of one for all months after June 1923 and 0 otherwise. The other 
variables are as defined as in Table 10 but measured in natural logs. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 1%. 
                     
       (A)       (B)         (C)           (D)               (E)                 (F)   (G)          (H)   
        dependent  variable 
   ln of  ln of  ln of  ln of  ln of  ln of  ln of    ln of 
   absolute relative  absolute relative  absolute  relative  absolute  relative 
independent variable    spread  spread  spread spread  spread  spread  spread    spread 
             
natural log of  individual    -0.24906*  -0.25103*  -0.20055* -0.20351*  -0.17231*  -0.17376* -0.12661*  -0.12984* 
security volume    (0.0035)  (0.0035)  (0.0040)  (0.0041) (0.0096) (0.0096)  (0.0094)  (0.0095) 
             
natural log of  individual    0.28670*  -0.69376*  0.22904*  -0.73150*  0.27033*  -0.70907*  0.17715*  -0.77954* 
security closing price    (0.0112)  (0.0116)  (0.0150) (0.0169)  (0.0113)  (0.0118)  (0.0152)  (0.0184) 
             
natural log of  individual    0.04205*  0.04964*      0.03936*  0.04725*     
security  volatility   (0.0096)  (0.0096)     (0.0096)  (0.0097)     
             
Post-Silkworth    0.11246* 0.11071* 0.06212* 0.06006*  0.05118**  0.05134** 0.00142  0.00394 
Resignation    (0.0193) (0.0192) (0.0192) (0.0192) (0.0221) (0.0220)  (0.0214)  (0.0214) 
             
natural  log  of  NYSE        0.03405*  0.02847**  0.06387*  0.05331* 
total  monthly  volume        (0.0130)  (0.0130)  (0.0135)  (0.0137) 
               
natural  log  of          0.11541*  0.11614*  0.09219*  0.09312* 
broker's  call  rate        (0.0100)  (0.0099)  (0.0096)  (0.0096) 
             
natural  log  of  security's        -0.08875*  -0.08926*  -0.08894*  -0.08856* 
share of total volume            (0.0098)  (0.0098)  (0.0099)  (0.0099) 
             
 
  58natural  log  of          -0.08731*  -0.09812*  -0.06244**  -0.07464* 
concentration  ratio        (0.0282) (0.0284)  (0.0279)  (0.0282) 
             
constant    -0.39366* -0.44353* -0.62722* -0.77398* -1.53799* -1.50993*  -2.14374*  -2.13434* 
    (0.0460) (0.0463) (0.0621) (0.0681) (0.1747) (0.1743)  (0.1784)  (0.1783) 
             
Company Fixed Effects    no  no  yes  yes  no  no  yes    yes 
Observations    12389 12389 12389 12389  12389  12389  12389    12389 
R-squared    0.339 0.536 0.423 0.594  0.362  0.552  0.442    0.607 
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